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Abstract
In this study we develop and calibrate a search and matching model of the German labour
market and analyze the impact of recent immigration. Our model has two production sectors
(manufacturing and services), two skill groups and two ethnic groups of workers (natives
and immigrants). Moreover, we allow for the possibility of self-employment, endogenous
price and wage setting and fiscal redistribution policy. We find that search frictions are less
important for wages of the low skilled, especially in manufacturing, whereas wages of the high
skilled are more sensitive to their outside opportunities. Furthermore, employment chances
of immigrant workers are up to four times lower than employment chances of native workers,
especially in the high skill segment. Our results show that recent immigration to Germany,
including refugees, has a moderate negative effect on the welfare of low skill workers in
manufacturing (-0.6%), but all other worker groups are gaining from immigration, with high
skill service employees gaining the most (+4.3%). This is because the productivity of high
(low) skill workers is increasing (decreasing) and there is a higher demand for services. The
overall effect of recent immigration is estimated at +1.6%. Finally, we observe that productive
capacities of immigrant workers are underutilized in Germany and a policy implementing
equal employment opportunities can generate a welfare gain equal to +0.9% with all worker
groups (weakly) gaining due to the redistribution.
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1 Introduction
This study investigates the effect of immigration on the German labour market in a search and
matching framework. In particular, we estimate the long-term impact of immigrants who entered
Germany in the period 2008-2016. Existing literature is focused on estimating wage effects of
immigration and is mostly based on the assumption of a competitive labour market with the
marginal pricing of labour1. This approach doesn’t take into account the bargaining nature of
wage-setting in Germany and low mobility of workers, implying that frictional unemployment
may be an important transmission channel when analyzing the effect of immigration, which
is not captured by the neo-classical competitive market framework. Moreover, there remain
open questions concerning the general equilibrium effects and welfare changes in response to
immigration. Our study addresses these issues by developing a search and matching model with
endogenous job-creation, bargained wages, self-employment by native and immigrant workers,
endogenous output prices and fiscal adjustments. Hence we are able to decompose the total effect
of immigration into the separate contributions of a rise in labour supply, endogenous response
of the labour demand, higher aggregate demand for goods and services and the corresponding
adjustment in output prices, unemployment benefits and public expenditures. To the best of
our knowledge there is no other study for Germany that identifies and estimates these effects
in a unified labour market framework with search frictions. To calibrate the model we use data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel and aggregate macroeconomic indicators.
More specifically, we consider a labour market with two production sectors: tradable (man-
ufacturing) and non-tradable (services). In both sectors output is produced by means of high
and low skill labour combined together by means of a CES production function2. Thus there are
four separate submarkets in our model depending on the sector and the skill level of workers.
Job creation (vacancies) in every submarket is modeled by means of a search and matching
model following Pissarides (2000). Every worker can be a native or an immigrant, so there are
eight distinct groups in our model depending on the ethnic origin, skill level of the worker and
the production sector. Native and immigrant workers apply for the same vacancies in each of
the four submarkets, however, their hiring chances, productivities and wages can be different.
Wages are set by means of Nash-bargaining and reflect differences in productivities and outside
opportunities of workers.
Every worker can be employed, unemployed or self-employed. Our motivation to include the
state of self-employment into the model is due to the fact that in Germany immigrant workers
are overrepresented in self-employment compared to regular paid employment (Metzger (2016)).
Thus it is possible that some immigrant workers enter self-employment out of necessity if their
chances of finding a regular paid job are too low. For example, Constant and Zimmermann
(2006) report that immigrant workers in Germany are more likely to enter self-employment
if they feel discriminated in the regular labour market. This means that immigration effects
produced in the absence of self-employment can lead to biased estimates since such a model
would overpredict the rise in unemployment in response to the new immigration inflow.
Further, workers have homothetic preferences with a CES utility function and decide how
1Exceptions include Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) and Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri and Poutvaara (2014)
2In our benchmark calibration we use the Cobb-Douglas form as a limiting case of the CES, but in the
extensions we also consider the elasticity of substitution between high and low skill workers larger than 1.
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to spend their income (wage, unemployment benefit or profits from self-employment) between
consumption of goods and services. From an aggregate perspective, we set a fixed price for
tradables (manufactured goods), but the price for services is endogenously determined, so in
the equilibrium the demand for services is equal to the supply of services. Finally, we assume
a balanced budget of the planner, who collects income taxes, pays out unemployment benefits
and distributes the rest as a lump-sum transfer to all workers.
We find that the number of immigrant workers in Germany remained virtually unchanged in
the years 2008-2010, but increased thereafter by almost 20%. So having calibrated our model by
using GSOEP data from 2008 we analyzed the implications of a 20% increase in immigration.
At the calibration stage we find that wages of low skill workers, especially, in manufacturing
are closer to the marginal productivities of these workers. The situation is different for high
skill workers, whose wages are closer to their reservation wages and reflect to a large extent
their outside opportunities in terms of finding jobs. This means that search frictions are less
important for the low skilled, whose wages can even be approximated by the marginal product,
but are more important for the high skilled. Intuitively, this could be due to the fact that low
skilled workers in Germany are largely covered by labour unions, whereas high skill workers are
more likely to negotiate the wage individually.
In order to calibrate the matching function for Germany we used aggregate data of the Federal
Employment Agency (BA) for the period 2001-2013. We find that the average vacancy duration
increased by 72% over this period, reflecting a rising shortage of the workforce. Our estimate of
the elasticity of the matching function (job-filling rate) is equal to 0.44 and is not far from 0.5,
which is often assumed in the search and matching literature. Finally, at the calibration stage we
observe a large gap in unemployment rates between native and immigrant workers. Given that
vacancies are publicly posted in our model, differences in unemployment rates are reflected in the
probability of being hired conditional on matching. We find that the hiring chances of immigrant
workers are lower compared to native workers, especially, for high skill workers. For example,
immigrant worker are three times less likely to get a job in manufacturing occupations and four
times less likely to get a job in services. The situation is less dramatic for low skill workers
in manufacturing, where the hiring chances of both immigrants and natives are approximately
equal. Intuitively, this could be due to the larger importance of language skills in high skill jobs,
more uncertainty about the quality of foreign education and/or stronger hiring discrimination.
Having performed the calibration we analyzed the implications of a 20% increase in immigra-
tion observed in Germany in the last eight years. The benchmark scenario in our model is skill
and sector-neutral immigration3. In this case we find that immigration leads to 0.55% higher
aggregate welfare in Germany, but this estimate is prior to the fiscal adjustment of the budget.
Further we find that immigration leads to a positive surplus of the public budget since taxes
paid by new immigrant employees dominate additional expenses on benefits paid to the new
unemployed migrants. Allowing for higher lump-sum transfers to restore the balance of the bud-
get we report a total increase in welfare equal to 1.65%. This positive effect of immigration on
public finances in Germany is not completely unexpected. For example, in his empirical research
Bonin (2014) reports that a netto contribution of an average immigrant living in Germany in
3In addition, we also consider a scenario with only low skill immigration. Since detailed information on the
skill composition of recent immigrants in Germany is not yet available, our two scenarios provide a lower and an
upper bound for the real effect of immigration.
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2012 was about e3300 with the total contribution of all immigrants equal to e22 Bln.
Considering the effect on different worker groups, we find that productivity of low skill
workers falls, whereas the productivity of high skill workers is increasing. Since manufacturing
is a low skill intensive sector, and low skill immigrants are the majority, output in manufacturing
increases stronger than the output in services, which is a high skill intensive sector. This leads to
the overproportional increase in the internal demand for services and raises the price of services.
So there is an asymmetric effect on the two sectors. Whereas manufacturing workers are worse
off due to the fact that services become more expensive, workers employed in services are gaining
since higher prices stimulate job creation in their sector. Overall, low skill workers employed
in manufacturing face lower wages and higher unemployment. Combined with a higher price of
services this leads to the change in welfare of these workers equal to −1.7% prior to the budget
adjustment and −0.6% afterwards. High skill workers employed in manufacturing gain in terms
of productivity, which leads to higher wages and lower unemployment, but this positive effect is
mitigated by higher prices, so the change in their welfare is equal to −0.6% prior to the budget
adjustment and +0.4% afterwards. Low skill workers employed in services gain higher wages
and lower unemployment, which is due to the positive effect of the higher price. So the change in
their welfare is equal to +1.6% prior to the budget adjustment and +2.8% afterwards. Finally,
high skill workers employed in services gain most from immigration. Not only their productivity
increases, but also the price for their services is higher. This is associated with a change in
welfare equal to +3.3% prior to the budget adjustment and +4.3% afterwards.
Given the lower hiring chances of immigrant workers observed in Germany, it is possible that
their skills are underutilized. Thus there is a question about the change in welfare associated
with improving the hiring chances of immigrant workers. In order to address this question
we have generated a counterfactual economy with equal hiring chances between native and
immigrant workers. In reality, this step could take the form of an easier access to language
and integration courses, easier application process for recognizing foreign diplomas and/or anti-
discrimination policies. We find that welfare gains of immigrant workers, especially high skilled,
are substantial and dominate small welfare losses of native workers stemming from the fall in
marginal productivity. So the average welfare gain of all workers prior to the budget adjustment
is equal to 0.5%. Furthermore, higher wages of immigrant workers, resulting from better outside
opportunities, mean higher tax income and a moderate surplus of the public budget. Taking
into account better financing of public goods, which in our model takes the form of lump-sum
transfers to the population, we find that the overall welfare gain increases to 0.9%. Thus we
conclude that due to the redistributive tax policy even native workers gain welfare from an
improvement in the hiring chances of immigrants.
Further, we have done several extensions and robustness checks. First, we have extended
the model to account for proportional unemployment benefits. So in this extension we keep
a constant replacement rate, but the unemployment benefit is moving in the same direction
as the wage. We find that proportional unemployment benefits amplify the positive effect of
immigration. This is because increasing wages of all worker groups, except low skill workers
in manufacturing, raise their unemployment benefits and put an additional upward pressure on
wages. So the overall gain in worker’s welfare is equal to 2.0% with proportional unemployment
benefits, which is larger than 1.6% in the benchmark case. Next we have increased the elasticity
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of substitution between high and low skill workers from 1 (Cobb-Douglas function in the bench-
mark case) to 1/0.34 ≈ 2.94 following the estimation by D’Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri (2010).
We find that stronger complementarity is beneficial for the low skilled and costly for the high
skilled. For example, the rise in wages of all high skill workers is mitigated, whereas the rise
in wages of the low skilled in services is amplified. This, however, doesn’t change the overall
welfare increase from skill- and sector-neutral immigration, which remains at the level of 1.6%.
Using a search and matching framework to address the impact of immigration is a relatively
recent tendency in the literature. For example, Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) have incor-
porated a nested CES production function with capital, skilled and unskilled labour into the
frictional labour market and calibrated this model to the U.S. economy, which experienced a
high-skill biased immigration in the period 2000-2009. They conclude that the overall effect
of immigration in the U.S. in the considered period should be estimated as positive. Second
closely related study is by Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri and Poutvaara (2014). These authors
calibrated their search and matching model to 20 different OECD countries and arrived at a
general conclusion that immigration in the period 2000–2011 has increased the welfare of native
workers in almost all these countries. Our model has a number of similarities with Battisti et
al. (2014) e.g. the wage gap between natives and immigrants, redistributive fiscal policy and
perfect substitution between these groups in the CES production function. However, there are
also notable deviations, for example, in our model we consider two production sectors – man-
ufacturing and services – with an endogenous price setting in services and self-employment of
native and immigrant workers. We find that the model with two production sectors is better
in capturing the asymmetric effects of immigration on high and low skill workers, who are not
equally distributed between these sectors. In particular, our model takes into account that low
skill workers, who are overrepresented in manufacturing, are more protected against changes in
the domestic output demand since manufactured goods are largely traded on the international
market. Another departure from Battisti et al. (2014) is that in our model differences in the
unemployment rates between natives and immigrants are captured by lower hiring chances of
immigrant workers, whereas it is captured by higher job destruction rates in their study.
Another study by Ortega (2000) also deals with the issue of immigration in a frictional labour
market. He considers a two–country model and shows that both equilibria with and without
immigration between the two countries are possible, but the equilibrium with immigration Pareto
dominates the other one. Finally, there are two other studies combining immigration and search
frictions by Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016) and Nanos and Schluter (2014). In the former
paper immigrant workers earn lower wages which leads to higher profits of firms. So they show
theoretically and empirically that an inflow of immigrant workers intensifies job creation due
to the higher expected profits of firms, which benefits natives and incumbent immigrants. This
effect is also present in our study, however, in our model this positive effect is reduced due to
the fact that not all matches between firms and immigrant workers lead to employment. Hence
an inflow of immigrant workers reduces the job-filling rate for open vacancies and may even lead
to lower job creation. We show that this negative effect disappears if hiring chances of native
and immigrant workers are equalized. To the best of our knowledge our study is the first one
which formalized this effect.
The study by Nanos and Schluter (2014) is also close to our research because it uses empirical
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data for Germany and estimates a ”migrant effect”, which is a wage difference between native
and migrant workers stemming from the fact that migrant workers receive lower wage offers
conditional on the same productivity. This effect is also a part of our model, because worse
employment opportunities of immigrant workers lead to lower reservation wages and generate
a migrant wage gap. One important advantage of Nanos and Schluer (2014) over our work is
that they explicitly allow for on-the-job search in their model, however, it comes along with the
assumption that labour markets of immigrant workers are completely separated from those of
natives, which is different in our model and allows us to quantify the general equilibrium effects
of migrants on native workers.
Next we turn to the characterization of the large literature on the effect of immigration in a
competitive labour market framework without frictions. Two early studies by Borjas (1999) and
BenGad (2004) consider a setting with homogeneous workers and show that the response of wages
strongly depends on the mobility of capital stock. If capital supply is fixed and inelastic, wages
will be expected to fall while the return on capital will rise in response to an exogenous increase
of labour supply. As a result native workers are penalized by immigration whereas the position
of capital owners is improved. Moreover, the gain of capital holders is found to dominate the
former wage effect and the overall welfare in the host country is increased (positive immigration
surplus). In contrast, the immigration surplus is zero and wages remain unchanged if capital is
perfectly mobile and the capital market is competitive. Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann (1994)
and BenGad (2008) extend this framework to the case of heterogeneous skill groups. Even though
both skilled and unskilled wages are generally expected to fall with a skill-balanced immigration,
the elasticity of labour demand and the skill direction of immigration are found to be crucial in
this setting. Empirical evidence suggests that the demand for skilled labour is less elastic than
the demand for unskilled labour. Hence according to these studies the immigration surplus is
maximized when the inflow of immigrants is exclusively skilled. To the best of our knowledge
Schmidt et al. (1994) is the only immigration study emphasizing the importance of incorporating
labour unions and wage bargaining into the model, so they consider a right-to-manage model
with a monopoly union, however, it is not calibrated to any specific economy.
Altonji and Card (1991) identify one of the positive general equilibrium effects of immigration.
Specifically, in their model immigrants are likely to increase the overall demand for goods and
services in the receiving country. This demand effect will tend to increase the overall demand for
native labour, thus raising native wages and employment. Among more recent studies this idea is
emphasized by Moretti (2010a,b), who writes that ”Every time a local economy generates a new
job..., additional jobs might also be created, mainly through increased demand for local goods
and services” (multiplier effect). Even though Moretti (2010a,b) doesn’t consider immigration
he finds that for each additional job in manufacturing, 1.6 jobs are created in the non–tradable
sector. Moreover, one additional skilled job in the tradable sector generates 2.5 job in local
goods and services. It is a similar multiplier effect in response to immigration that we quantify
in our study for Germany.
Recent studies investigating the effect of immigration started with the seminal approach by
Borjas (2003) who observed that the rise in the U.S. immigration was not uniformly distributed
across education/experience cells. This novel approach was further extended in the research of
Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for the United Kingdom and Damuri, Ottaviano,
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Peri (2010) for Germany. These studies allow for the imperfect substitution of native and
immigrant workers and show that the additional inflow of foreign workers to UK and Germany
has a large negative effect on wages of the existing immigrants in the country leaving native
wages virtually unaffected. This conclusion is supported by Felbermayr, Geis and Kohler (2010)
who include the possibility of unemployment into the model and show that a new immigration
inflow of workers from the east-ward enlargement of the European Union had a strong positive
effect on the unemployment of incumbent foreign workers in Germany. On the contrary, the
effect on native employment is very modest.
Dustmann and Preston (2012) have criticized the education-experience cell approach by ob-
serving that immigrant workers downgrade at arrival, which implies accepting jobs with a lower
education/experience requirement than comparable native workers. Hence immigrants may com-
pete with native workers at parts of the skill distribution which is different to where they should
be assigned based on their observable characteristics. In response to this critique Dustmann,
Frattini and Preston (2013) develop a new estimation strategy and study a continuous effect of
immigration on workers situated at different quantiles of the earnings distribution. Their find-
ings suggest that immigration reduced wages of natives below the 20th percentile of the wage
distribution in the UK, but slightly increased wages in the upper part of the distribution.
Overall, all of these studies are focused on the effect of immigration on wages rather than
(un)employment. Only D’Amuri et al. (2010) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) follow a reduced
form approach and assume a negative relation between employment and wages, however, this
assumption is not micro-founded and there is no economic mechanism in their model leading to
this relationship. This is the primary difference between these studies and our approach.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents notation and the economic envi-
ronment. Section 3 describes the model, while section 4 presents the calibration of the model
to the German labour market. Section 5 contains our main results for the benchmark model.
Sections 6 and 7 include extensions, counterfactual evidence and some alternative calibrations.
Finally, section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Economic environment
There are four demographic groups of workers: low skill immigrants gLI , low skill natives (g
L
N ),
high skill immigrants gHI and high skill natives g
H
N . The workers have homothetic preferences
with a CES utility function and discount future utility flows at rate r. The total labour force is
normalized to 1, so we get:
gLI + g
L
N + g
H
I + g
H
N = 1 (1)
We use the subscript n to denote the origin of the worker {I,N} and the superscript i to
indicate the skill level of the worker {L,H}. Every worker belongs to one of the two production
sectors: (1) manufacturing or (2) services. Subscript j corresponds to the production sector
{1, 2}, so that gijn is the number of workers with origin n, skill level i belonging to the production
sector j. With this notation we have: gin = g
i
1n + g
i
2n. We assume that skills are specific to a
given sector and not transferable, thus it is not possible for workers to change the sector. Every
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worker can be employed in a firm, unemployed or self-employed, so that: gijn = e
i
jn + u
i
jn + s
i
jn,
where eijn is the number of employed workers, u
i
jn – the number of unemployed workers and s
i
jn
- the number of self-employed workers in a given origin-skill-sector group. There is a possibility
of self-employment or entrepreneurship for both immigrant and native workers of any skill type.
However, we are agnostic about the reasons for self-employment since it is not clear ex-ante
whether push or pull factors are dominating for different demographic groups. Thus in our
model transitions into self-employment take place at an exogenous arrival rate αijn. Note that
we allow this rate to be heterogeneous across worker groups, this way we try to capture possible
differences in the regulation and access to self-employment, e.g. mandatory licenses, in different
occupations. At rate γ self-employed workers are not successful in their business and return to
the unemployment pool.
There are four labour markets in the economy depending on the production sector and the
skill level of workers. Let vij denote the number of vacancies in each of these markets. Both
native and immigrant workers are applying to the same vacancies in a given labour market. The
unemployed workers are matched with vacancies through a matching function given bym(uij , v
i
j),
where uij is the total number of searching native and immigrant workers: u
i
j = u
i
jI + u
i
jN . The
matching function is homogeneous of degree 1, concave and increasing in both its arguments.
Later we shall discuss the specific form we use for our empirical analysis. The rate at which a
worker is matched with a vacant position in a specific labour market is m(uij , v
i
j)/u
i
j = λ(θ
i
j),
where θij = v
i
j/u
i
j reflects the tightness of the labour market for skill group i in sector j. Even
though the probability of matching with vacancies λ(θij) is identical for native and immigrant
workers, their hiring chances are not. This difference is captured by an additional parameter
hijI ≤ h
i
jN = 1, which is specific to the given labour market and reflects a lower hiring probability
for immigrant workers compared to natives. Intuitively, it captures a lower language proficiency
of immigrant workers and hiring discrimination by firms4. Note that hijN = 1 for all sub-markets.
Thus the job-finding rate for immigrant workers becomes hijIλ(θ
i
j) ≤ λ(θ
i
j). Next the rate at
which a firm fills a vacant position is m(uij , v
i
j)/v
i
j = q(θ
i
j). Thus q(θ
i
j) is the probability of filling
a vacancy. Again this rate is lower and equal to hijq(θ
i
j) if the firm is matched with an immigrant
worker. Since the matching function is increasing in both arguments we have: λ′(θij) > 0 while
q′(θij) < 0. Every job can be destroyed at rate δ due to some adverse exogenous shock. We
assume that this rate is identical for all worker groups.
In terms of production we follow the approach of Acemoglu (2001) and assume that workers
with different skills produce different intermediate goods which are used in the production of the
final good in each of the two production sectors. The total input of low skilled intermediate goods
in sector j = 1, 2 is equal to nLj ≡ e
L
jI+ψ
L
jNe
L
jN+ϕ
L
jIs
L
jI+ϕ
L
jNs
L
jN as it is produced by low skilled
workers in paid employment and self-employed agents who can be native or immigrant. Even
though we assume perfect substitution between native and immigrant workers (infinite elasticity
of substitution), we do allow for differences in the effective productivity of these groups reflected
in parameters ψijn for paid workers and ϕ
i
jn for the self-employed. This assumption is motivated
by the findings in empirical studies, reporting finite but large elasticities of substitution between
native and immigrant workers in the range between 20 and 305. The total input of high skill
4See Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann (2005), Constant and Zimmermann (2006), Kaas and Manger
(2012), Constant and Rinne (2013) for hiring discrimination between natives and immigrants in Germany.
5See the debate in Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
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intermediate goods in sector j is equal to nHj ≡ e
H
jI + ψ
H
jNe
H
jN + ϕ
H
jIs
H
jI + ϕ
H
jNs
H
jN . The total
output Yj of the final good in sector j = 1, 2 is then given by the CES technology:
Yj =
(
χj(n
L
j )
ρ−1
ρ + (1− χj)(n
H
j )
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution between high and low skill labour. In the limiting case
when ρ→ 1, this production function converges to the Cobb-Douglas technology with the power
parameter χj . Intermediate goods are sold in a competitive market, thus intermediate goods
producers are paid the marginal productivity of their goods, that is pjy
i
jn, where pj is the price
per unit of the final good and yijn = ∂Yj/∂e
i
jn. In a similar way the output of self-employed
entrepreneurs is given by pjν
i
jn, where ν
i
jn = ∂Yj/∂s
i
jn.
Intermediate goods producers can open vacancies in each of the four labour markets with
the corresponding up-front cost Kij per vacancy. Intuitively, this corresponds to the cost of
capital and equipment necessary for the production. Afterwards, when the position is filled,
there are no other costs than gross wages wijn. In the equilibrium, the number of vacancies v
i
j
is determined at the point where the present value of expected profits is equal to the entry cost
Kij . We assume that self-employed operating in the same labour market are not able to pay the
full cost of equipment, so their capital is rented. Thus self-employed entrepreneurs are incurring
a flow cost of capital rKijn. The principle advantage of being self-employed is the possibility to
avoid the cost of labour as self-employed entrepreneurs are not hiring further workers. Finally,
unemployed workers receive benefits bijn which are financed from the public budget. The positive
surplus of the budget remaining after the unemployment benefits are paid out is distributed as
a lump-sum payment T to all agents (employed, unemployed and self-employed).
Let t denote the income tax, so that paid workers receive the flow income wijn(1 − t) from
their employers and T from the public budget. Further, let πijn denote the flow profits of self-
employed. These profits are classified as income for the purpose of taxation, so the net income
of self-employed is then πijn(1− t) + T . Unemployment benefits are not taxed. Given the total
disposable income workers maximize their utility Ω(c1, c2) by choosing the optimal consumption
bundle (c1, c2) subject to the budget constraint. Finally, we assume that manufactured goods
are traded on international markets and their price p1 is fixed. On the contrary, service sector is
non-tradable, and it’s price is endogenous in the model. In the equilibrium p2 is determined at
the point where the aggregate demand for services is equal to the aggregate supply of services.
3 The Model
As discussed in the preceding section, variables pjy
i
jn and pjν
i
jn represent the nominal marginal
productivity of a worker in a given origin-skill-sector group and they are equal to the price of the
respective intermediate good. Given the CES production technology, the marginal productivities
yLjI and y
H
jI can be found as:
yLjI =
∂Yj
∂eLjI
=
(
χj(n
L
j )
ρ−1
ρ + (1− χj)(n
H
j )
ρ−1
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
χj(n
L
j )
−1
ρ
yHjI =
∂Yj
∂eHjI
=
(
χj(n
L
j )
ρ−1
ρ + (1− χj)(n
H
j )
ρ−1
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
(1− χj)(n
H
j )
−1
ρ
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All the remaining marginal productivities can be found as functions of yLjI or y
H
jI : The marginal
products of different worker groups are then given by:
yLjN =
∂Yj
∂eLjN
= ψLjNy
L
jI y
H
jN =
∂Yj
∂eHjN
= ψHjNy
H
jI (2)
νLjI =
∂Yj
∂sLjI
= ϕLjIy
L
jI ν
H
jI =
∂Yj
∂sHjI
= ϕHjIy
H
jI (3)
νLjN =
∂Yj
∂sLjN
= ϕLjNy
L
jI ν
H
jN =
∂Yj
∂sHjN
= ϕHjNy
H
jI (4)
3.1 Demand Side of the Economy
The pool of consumers is given by employees, unemployed agents and the self-employed. There
is no possibility of saving income or transferring it over time. Let M ijn denote the net disposable
income of a given consumer which can be wijn(1− t) + T , π
i
jn(1− t) + T or b
i
jn + T depending
on the labour market status of a given worker. The CES utility function Ω(c1, c2) is given by:
Ω(c1, c2) = [a1c
σ−1
σ
1 + a2c2
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1 (5)
where c1 is consumption of good 1 (manufactured good) and c2 is consumption of good 2 (ser-
vices). Moreover, a1 + a2 = 1 and σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods.
If σ → ∞ the two goods are perfect substitutes, in contrast, when σ → 0, the two goods are
perfect complements. Note that there are no other differences among consumers apart from
their income. The utility maximization problem determines the quantity of goods demanded:
max
c1,c2
Ω(c1, c2) s.t. p1c1 + p2c2 =M
i
jn
The utility maximization problem gives us the following solution:
cj(p1, p2,M
i
jn) =
M ijn
( pj
aj
)−σ
p1
(
p1
a1
)−σ
+ p2
(
p2
a2
)−σ (6)
It is straightforward to see that consumption cj(p1, p2,M
i
jn) is increasing in the income M
i
jn but
decreasing in its price pj .
The aggregate income in the economy is equal to p1Y1+p2Y2 and it can be used for consump-
tion of manufactured goods or services. Thus we get the following aggregate demand equation
for services:
(p1Y1 + p2Y2)
(
p2
a2
)−σ
p1
(
p1
a1
)−σ
+ p2
(
p2
a2
)−σ = Y2 ⇒ p2 = p1(a2a1
)(Y2
Y1
)− 1
σ
where the left-hand side is the aggregate demand for services and the right-hand side is the
output. Since the price p1 is fixed, we can see that a higher output of good 2 (services) has a
negative effect on the price of services p2. However, there is an opposite effect of output Y1.
This is because higher production of manufactured goods implies higher income of workers in
manufacturing and higher demand for services.
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In addition, note that the indirect utility of consumers Ωijn ≡ Ω(c1(p1, p2,M
i
jn), c2(p1, p2,M
i
jn))
is given by:
Ω(p1, p2,M
i
jn) =
M ijn
P
where P =
[
p1
(p1
a1
)−σ
+ p2
(p2
a2
)−σ] 11−σ
Here P is the aggregate price index and it is increasing in each of the prices p1 and p2. Thus
higher prices are associated with lower consumers’ utility Ω(p1, p2,M
i
jn).
3.2 Present value equations
Let V ij be the present value of an open vacancy for firms operating in submarket i, j. Further,
J ijN – is the present value of profits associated with hiring a native worker in this submarket. In
a similar way, let J ijI be the present value of profits associated with hiring an immigrant worker.
The present value of a given vacancy is then given by:
rV ij = q(θ
i
j)
[uijN
uij
(J ijN − V
i
j )h
i
jN +
uijI
uij
(J ijI − V
i
j )h
i
jI
]
(7)
where uijI/u
i
j is a probability that the firm will be matched with an unemployed immigrant
worker and uijN/u
i
j is a probability that the firm will be matched with an unemployed native
worker, since uij = u
i
jI + u
i
jN . Also note that h
i
jI ≤ 1 is the probability of hiring conditional on
a match for the immigrant worker in submarket i, j, while hijN = 1. The present value of a filled
job is given by the following equation
rJ ijn = pjy
i
jn − w
i
jn − δ[J
i
jn − V
i
j ]− α
i
jn[J
i
jn − V
i
j ] (8)
where pjy
i
jn is the value of output produced by the worker, w
i
jn is the nominal gross wage
reflecting the cost of labour. In addition, at rate δ the job can be destroyed. Alternatively, at
rate αijn the worker quits the job and enters the state of self-employment. The net present value
of profits J ijn − V
i
j is then expressed as:
J ijn − V
i
j =
pjy
i
jn − w
i
jn − rV
i
j
r + δ + αijn
(9)
Recall that firms have to pay an up-front cost Kij of capital and equipment for entering the
submarket i, j. Due to the free-entry, in the equilibrium we have that Kij = V
i
j , which is
equivalent to:
rKij = q(θ
i
j)
(
hijN
uijN
uij
[pjyijN − wijN − rKij
r + δ + αijN
]
+ hijI
uijI
uij
[pjyijI − wijI − rKij
r + δ + αijI
])
(10)
The present value of unemployment for immigrants is given by the following equation
rU ijn =
bijn + T
P
+ hijnλ(θ
i
j)[W
i
jn − U
i
jn] + α
i
jn[E
i
jn − U
i
jn] (11)
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where Ω(p1, p2, b
i
jn) = (b
i
jn + T )/P since unemployment benefits are not taxed. h
i
jnλ(θ
i
jn) is the
probability of being matched and hired by the firm. W ijn − U
i
jn is the rent associated with the
job and Eijn − U
i
jn is the rent associated with entering self-employment at rate α
i
jn. Note that
this equation is indirectly based on the assumption that unemployed workers search for jobs in
their primary production sector and do not switch the sector. Even though this assumption
is restrictive, it is supported by our empirical findings of relatively low cross-sectional labour
mobility in Germany presented in a later section of this paper. Moreover, other studies such as
Nanos and Schluter (2014) also report evidence on strong occupational immobility in Germany.
The present value of paid-employment is given by the following equation
rW ijn =
wijn(1− t) + T
P
− δ[W ijn − U
i
jn] + α
i
jn[E
i
jn −W
i
jn] (12)
where the last term is again the rent from becoming self-employed. Note that this possibility is
available in both states: employment and unemployment. Moreover, value changes [Eijn − U
i
jn]
and [Eijn−W
i
jn] are not restricted to be positive or negative. Rather we let empirical data reveal
which worker groups gain by entering self-employment because the pool factors are dominating
or lose value because of the dominating push factors. Some real life examples of the former
case include situations when workers with innovative entrepreneurial ideas obtain funding for
establishing a new start-up, which is the case of self-employment out of opportunity. Whereas
examples of the latter case include cases when temporary contracts of employees or regular
unemployment benefits of the unemployed expire, which leads to the self-employment out of
necessity. The worker’s rent from having a job can then be expressed as:
W ijn − U
i
jn =
[wijn(1− t) + T ]/P − rU
i
jn + α
i
jn(E
i
jn − U
i
jn)
r + δ + αijn
The present value of self-employment is given by the following equation
rEijn =
πijn(1− t) + T
P
− γ[Eijn − U
i
jn] (13)
where πijn = pjν
i
jn − rK
i
j is the nominal profit/income of self-employed workers and γ is the
rate at which their business turns unsuccessful. Note that rKij is the cost of renting capital for
self-employed agents and νijn is their productivity in terms of production units, so that pjν
i
jn is
the nominal value of output.
Finally, we can write down the government budget constraint:
∑
n=N,I,j=1,2,i=L,H
t(wijne
i
jn + π
i
jns
i
jn)−
∑
n=N,I,j=1,2,i=L,H
bijnu
i
jn = T (14)
where the first term on the left-hand side is the total revenue from income taxes. The second
term corresponds to the total expenditures on unemployment benefits, while T is the remaining
budget surplus which is distributed as a lump-sum payment to all economic agents. Recall that
the total population size is normalized to 1.
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3.3 Steady state values of unemployment and self-employment
Changes in the stocks of employed, unemployed and self-employed workers are given by:
u˙ijn = δe
i
jn + γs
i
jn − (h
i
jnλ
i
j(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn)u
i
jn = 0
s˙ijn = α
i
jn(e
i
jn + u
i
jn)− γs
i
jn = 0
e˙ijn = h
i
jnλ
i
j(θ
i
j)u
i
jn − (δ + α
i
jn)e
i
jn = 0
where gijn = u
i
jn + e
i
jn + s
i
jn. Each of these equations implies that the change in the stock of
workers in a given state is given by the inflow minus the outflow of workers from this state.
The focus of our research is on the steady state distribution, that is u˙ijn = 0 and s˙
i
jn = 0 which
implies the following steady state distribution of workers across states:
sijn =
αijng
i
jn
αijn + γ
uijn =
(δ + αijn)γg
i
jn
(δ + hijnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn)(α
i
jn + γ)
eijn = g
i
jn − s
i
jn − u
i
jn (15)
These equations show, for example, that a higher job-finding rate hijnλ(θ
i
j) is associated with a
lower unemployment rate uijn/g
i
jn.
3.4 Wage determination through Nash Bargaining
Once matched, workers and firms bargain over the wage, where the net gain of the worker is
given by W ijn−U
i
jn and the net gain of the firm is J
i
jn−V
i
j . Let the bargaining power of workers
in submarket i, j be given by βij . So the bargaining problem is given by:
( [wijn(1− t) + T ]/P − rU ijn + αijn(Eijn − U ijn)
r + δ + αijn
)βij
·
(pjyijn − wijn − rV ij
r + δ + αijn
)(1−βij)
−→ maxwijn
Thus we get the following first order condition:
β(1− t)
(pjy
i
jn − w
i
jn − rV
i
j )
r + δ + αijn
= (1− β)
wijn(1− t)− b
i
jn
r + δ + αijn + h
i
jnλ(θ
i
j)
where we have inserted the flow value of unemployment rU ijn. Note that the option to become
self-employed doesn’t influence the outcome of bargaining since the possibility to become self-
employed is not lost after entering paid employment. In a similar way, lump-sum transfers T
are not distortive as all individuals are eligible for receiving these transfers from the budget in
every labour market state. Taking this into account, we get the the following equilibrium wage
equation6
wijn =
βij(pjy
i
jn − rV
i
j )(r + δ + h
i
jnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn) + (1− β
i
j)(r + δ + α
i
jn)b
i
n/(1− t)
r + δ + βijh
i
jnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn
(16)
This equation shows that the wage is a weighted average between the net productivity pjy
i
jn−rV
i
j
and the gross unemployment benefit bin/(1− t). Recall, that in the equilibrium with free-entry
we have that Kij = V
i
j , so that higher start-up costs increase the required present value of an
6See appendix A for proof
13
open vacancy V ij . However, this is only possible if the present value of profits is higher, which
can be achieved with a lower wage.
3.5 The impact of immigration on job creation
In this subsection we explain the channels through which additional immigration influences the
economy in our model. Specifically, our attention is dedicated to the reaction of the market
tightness θij in response to the rise in immigration g
i
jI . Existing search and matching models
7
emphasize the point that immigrant workers are less likely to be eligible for unemployment
benefits, which weakens their bargaining position as compared to natives and leads to lower
wages. Thus an inflow of new immigrant workers reduces the average wage in the host country
and has a positive effect on job creation (market tightness). This effect is also present in our
model. To see this consider a simplified version of the model with αijN = α
i
jI = α
i
j , that is
the probability of becoming self-employed is the same for native and immigrant workers. The
job-creation condition (10) can then be written as:
rKij
q(θij)
=
(1−
ui
jI
uij
)(pjy
i
jN − w
i
jN − rK
i
j) + h
i
jI
ui
jI
uij
(pjy
i
jI − w
i
jI − rK
i
j)
r + δ + αij
= (17)
In a hypothetical situation when native and immigrant workers are hired with the same prob-
ability, that is hijI = 1, the probability for a firm to be matched with an immigrant worker
uijI/u
i
j is equal to the population fraction of immigrants g
i
jI/(g
i
jN + g
i
jI). In this situation the
response of the market tightness θij to higher g
i
jI solely depends on the amount of firm prof-
its generated by native and immigrant workers: pjy
i
jN − w
i
jN vs. pjy
i
jI − w
i
jI . For example,
Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016) show that higher immigration has a positive effect on the
market-tightness θij if immigrants are equally productive as natives but receive lower wages:
(pjy
i
jN −w
i
jN < pjy
i
jI −w
i
jI). Note however that this result strongly depends on the assumption
of equal employment opportunities between natives and immigrants. To see this consider the
case hijI < 1 and let for simplicity pjy
i
jN − w
i
jN = pjy
i
jI − w
i
jI = Π. The free-entry condition
then becomes:
rKij
q(θij)
=
(
1− (1− hijI)
uijI
uij
) Π− rKij
r + δ + αij
=
(
1−
(1− hijI)(δ + λ(θ
i
j) + α
i
j)g
i
jI
(δ + hijIλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
j)g
i
jN + (δ + λ(θ
i
j) + α
i
j)g
i
jI
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in θij and g
i
jI
Π− rKij
r + δ + αij
≡ J¯(θij , g
i
jI) (18)
The right-hand side of this equation represents the expected present value of profits after the
match with the applicant, let it be denoted J¯(θij , g
i
jI). It is a decreasing function of θ
i
j . This
is because the unemployment rate of native workers is more sensitive to changes in the market
tightness. Thus the unemployment rate of native workers falls stronger in response to a higher θij
than the unemployment rate of immigrant workers. This means that firms are more likely to be
matched with immigrant workers if θij is relatively high (formally
ui
jI
uij
is increasing in θij). Since
7Chassambouli and Palivos (2014), Battisti et al. (2014), Moreno-Galbis and Tritah (2016)
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not every match with an immigrant worker leads to employment, expected profits of firms (on the
right hand side) are falling in θij . The left-hand side of this equation corresponds to the expected
cost of an open vacancy. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium value of the market tightness obtained
at the intersection between the decreasing expected profit curve and the increasing expected cost
curve. Next consider the implications of an immigration inflow, that is a higher gijI . Given a
higher absolute number of immigrant workers, firms are even more likely to be matched with an
immigrant than before, which has a negative effect on expected profits J¯(θij , g
i
jI) because a lower
number of actual matches ends up in employment. If expected profits of firms fall then firms
open less vacancies per unemployed worker (lower θij), which hurts employment prospects of all
worker groups. Note that we consider a hypothetical case when native and immigrant workers
generate the same profits Π, thus lower employment chances of immigrants can only stem from
hiring discrimination.
J¯(θ, gI +∆)
J¯(θ, gI)
rK
q(θ)
θ
Figure 1: The impact of gijI on θ
i
j for identical profits from native and immigrant workers
To sum up, this section shows that an immigration inflow is likely to have a positive effect
on natives’ employment chances if profits generated by immigrant workers are higher than firms’
profits associated with native workers (for example, due to lower wages of immigrant workers).
On the other hand, this effect can be reversed if both worker groups generate equal profits, but
immigrant workers suffer from hiring discrimination. Thus this subsection shows that hiring
discrimination is likely to reduce the positive impact of immigration on native workers. To
the best of our knowledge this is a new effect which was not identified in the previous search
and matching literature on immigration. In the next sections we continue our analysis in a
quantitative framework and allow for the endogenous responses of prices pj and productivities
yijn which were assumed fixed throughout this subsection.
4 Calibration
To calibrate our model we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, wave 2008, which is
based on individual surveys. Even though in 2008 financial crisis had already reached the German
financial system, it did not yet spread to the German labour market. The unemployment rate
fell from 9.0% down to 7.8% between the years 2007 and 2008 and went slightly up to 8.1% in
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2009, thus our sample from 2008 can be seen as the last pre-crisis year for the German labour
market8. Overall, however, the labour market in Germany was largely unaffected by the financial
crisis and unemployment was falling from 11.7% in 2005 down to 6.4% in 2015, which is partially
due to the labour market reform in 2004-2005 (Hartz reforms).
Table 26 in the appendix gives the basic profile of the sample we use for our analysis. We
have a sample of 11075 workers. These are the workers who are actively participating in the
German labor market either as paid workers, self-employed or registered unemployed. Retired
people and non-participants are excluded from our sample. There are 9854 native and 1221
immigrant workers, which corresponds to the immigration rate equal to 11%. We use a broad
definition of immigration which includes foreign citizens and those, who changed their citizenship
for the German one at some point in their life. Exact definitions of all variables are presented
in the appendix. High skill workers are defined as those who completed more than 12 years of
schooling, which includes individuals with university and college degrees. In our sample, 28% of
immigrants and 39% of natives are high skilled, which shows that there is a larger proportion
of low skilled among immigrant workers compared to natives. The fraction of self-employed is
equal to 10.8%.
The unemployment rate in our sample is equal to 10.7%, which is somewhat higher than
the official level of 7.8%. This is probably due to the fact that we have excluded workers
in community services, marginally employed, those with zero working hours and workers on
vocational training from the sample. The unemployment rate of immigrant workers is higher
than the average and equal to 16.3%. This number is close to the official statistics in 2008,
according to which the unemployment rate of foreign workers in Germany was equal to 18.1%9
Even though both unemployment rates decreased over the last years the unemployment rate of
immigrant workers (14.6%) remains more than two times higher than the average unemployment
rate (6.4%) in 2015.
Sector 1 includes such industries as agriculture, energy, mining, manufacturing, construction
and trade, whereas Sector 2 includes transportation, banking, insurance and other services.
47% of workers in our sample are assigned to Sector 1 versus 53% of workers in Sector 2.
75% of workers in Sector 1 are low skilled, while only 50% are low skilled in Sector 2, which
reflects the fact that mining, manufacturing and construction are low skill intensive sectors,
while service occupations are balanced in terms of skills. Table 27 in the appendix shows
mobility of German employees in the period 2007-2008 by sector. This transition matrix includes
intermediate unemployment spells between the jobs as well as direct transitions from employment
in one sector to the other. In particular this table shows that only 2.4% of employees in sector
1 changed their sector within one year. The number is even lower for sector 2, where only 1.7%
of employees have changed their sector. Even though these numbers are not negligible they are
small and indicate low cross-sectional mobility of German workers. So this evidence justifies to
some extent our simplifying assumption that unemployed workers search for jobs in the same
production sector as their prior employment.
8Statistik der Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit, Arbeitslosigkeit im Zeitverlauf, March 2016
9Statistik der Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit. Arbeitslosenquoten. Monats-Jahreszahlen 2008.
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4.1 Transition rates
In this subsection we identify a vector of parameters: {r, γ, δ, αijn h
i
jI , η, λ0}. First, we set the
annual discount rate equal to 4%, which means r = 0.01 on quarterly basis. The average job
duration for employed workers is equal to 12.25 years or 49 quarters10. There is no significant
difference for the self-employed. Thus we set δ = γ = 1/49 ≈ 0.02. With these estimates we
can calculate the values for αijn, λ(θ
i
j) and h
i
jI based on equations (15). Tables 1 and 2 give the
summary of the results for Manufacturing (sector 1) and Services (sector 2) respectively.
Low skill workers gL1 /g1 = 0.7504 High skill workers g
H
1 /g1 = 0.2496
Variable Target Parameter value Variable Target Parameter value
Natives gL1N/g1 = 0.6381 Natives g
H
1N/g1 = 0.2220
sL1N/g
L
1N 0.0953 α
L
1N = 0.0021 s
H
1N/g
H
1N 0.1296 α
H
1N = 0.0030
uL1N/g
L
1N 0.1368 λ(θ
L
1 ) = 0.1241 u
H
1N/g
H
1N 0.0688 λ(θ
H
1 ) = 0.2677
Immigrants gL1I/g1 = 0.1121 Immigrants g
H
1I/g1 = 0.0276
sL1I/g
L
1I 0.0504 α
L
1I = 0.0011 s
H
1I/g
H
1I 0.1414 α
H
1I = 0.0033
uL1I/g
L
1I 0.1490 h
L
1I = 0.9120 u
H
1I/g
H
1I 0.1855 h
H
1I = 0.3157
Table 1: Calibration of labour turnover rates in sector 1: g1 = 0.47, δ = γ = 0.02
We can see that self-employment is more frequent for high skill workers, especially, in services.
High skill natives in services are most likely to become self-employed (sH2N/g
H
2N = 0.2039),
whereas low skill immigrants in services are least likely to become self-employed (sL2I/g
L
2I =
0.0324). The job-finding rate is lower in the low skill submarket compared to the high skill
submarket, which is intuitive since education typically improves the chances of finding a job.
Concerning employment chances of immigrant workers, we find that the hiring probability in
the low skill segment (hL1I = 0.9120) is relatively close to 1, which is the normalized value for
native workers. But the situation is different in the high skill submarket, where the employment
chances of immigrant workers are almost three times worse (hH1I = 0.3157) than the employment
chances of native workers. The situation is even worse in sector 2, where hH2I = 0.2518 indicating
that immigrant workers are about four times less likely to be hired compared to native workers.
Intuitively, this could be due to the larger importance of language skills in high skill jobs, more
uncertainty about the quality of foreign education and/or stronger hiring discrimination.
The next step includes estimation of the matching function m(uij , v
i
j). We assume a Cobb-
10The job duration of immigrant workers is below the average and is equal to 10.25 years or 41 quarters, which
corresponds to the quarterly job destruction rate of 0.024. Even though the difference between this number and
0.02 for native workers is significantly different from 0, it is small from the economic perspective as it only explains
a small portion of the observed differences in unemployment rates between native and migrant workers. Thus we
continue by assuming identical separation rates δ for both ethnic groups.
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Low skill workers gL2 /g2 = 0.5049 High skill workers g
H
2 /g2 = 0.4951
Variable Target Parameter value Variable Target Parameter value
Natives gL2N/g2 = 0.4550 Natives g
H
2N/g2 = 0.4611
sL2N/g
L
2N 0.0730 α
L
2N = 0.0016 s
H
2N/g
H
2N 0.2039 α
H
2N = 0.0051
uL2N/g
L
2N 0.1315 λ(θ
L
2 ) = 0.1305 u
H
2N/g
H
2N 0.0360 λ(θ
H
2 ) = 0.5304
Immigrants gL2I/g2 = 0.0500 Immigrants g
H
2I/g2 = 0.0340
sL2I/g
L
2I 0.0324 α
L
2I = 0.0007 s
H
2I/g
H
2I 0.159 α
H
2I = 0.0038
uL2I/g
L
2I 0.2077 h
L
2I = 0.5794 u
H
2I/g
H
2I 0.1271 h
H
2I = 0.2518
Table 2: Calibration of labour turnover rates in sector 2: g2 = 0.53, δ = γ = 0.02
Douglas form for the matching function given as follows:
m(uij , v
i
j) = λ0(u
i
j)
η(vij)
1−η (19)
and since q(θij) =
m(uij ,v
i
j)
vij
and θij =
vij
uij
we need the values of q(θij)and θ
i
j to carry out our
calibration. These values are later used to determine parameters λ0 and η. For estimating
these two parameters we use statistical information of the German Employment Office (2014)
(Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit) for the period 2001-2013. This report has information on the
absolute numbers of unemployed individuals (table 7.1), open vacancies (table 6.4) and the
average duration on vacancies. Using this data we find the job-filling rate q(θ) as the inverse of
the vacancy duration (expressed in quarters) and estimate the following regression:
ln q(θt) = lnλ0 − η ln θt + ǫt (20)
Our data is summarized in table 28 in the appendix. It shows that the average vacancy du-
ration in Germany increased from 46 weeks in 2001 to 79 weeks in 2013 indicating the rising
shortage of qualified workers . Due to the lack of sector- and skill-specific data on vacancies and
unemployment we use aggregate data for Germany to estimate the values of θijn. This regression
gives us values for λ0 and η equal to 0.5832 and 0.4379 respectively. In addition, figure 2 shows
actual and fitted values of the regression (R2 = 0.7). We can then estimate the values of θij for
the four different submarkets as:
θij =
(
hijnλ(θ
i
j)
λ0
) 1
1−η
(21)
Given data on unemployment rates and estimated market tightness values we can also uncover
the underlying values of vacancies per worker vij/g
i
j in every submarket. This data is summarized
in the following table:
18
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
LN
 jo
b−
fill
ing
 ra
te
−3 −2.5 −2 −1.5
LN market tightness
Figure 2: Actual and fitted values for the job-filling rate based on regression (20)
Manufacturing Services
Low skill High skill Low skill High skill
θij 0.0638 0.2501 0.0697 0.8512
vij/g
i
j 0.0088 0.0204 0.0097 0.0358
Table 3: Estimated values of endogenous variables θij and v
i
j/g
i
j
This table shows that market tightness values for low skill workers are similar in the two
production sectors, but there are large sectoral differences faced by high skill workers, with the
market tightness in services being more than three times larger (0.8512 > 0.2501).
4.2 Wages and productivities
In this subsection we estimate a vector of parameters {βij ,K
i
j , b
i
jn, t}. In order to do so we run
the following regression on our sample data to get the wage relationships of different groups of
paid-workers.
lnwl = φ+ φ1Hl + φ2Nl + φ3Hl ·Nl + φ4Ml + φ5Hl ·Ml + φ6Nl ·Ml + φ7Hl ·Nl ·Ml + εl
where H is the dummy for higher education, N for native, M for sector 1 and ε is the error
term. The reference group includes low skill immigrant workers employed in services (sector 2)
and earning a wage wL2I . Remember this regression excludes the self-employed workers. We use
the coefficients obtained from this regression and get the following relations
wL2I w
L
1I = (1 + φˆ4)w
L
2I
wH2I = (1 + φˆ1)w
L
2I w
H
1I = (1 + φˆ1 + φˆ4 + φˆ5)w
L
2I
wL2N = (1 + φˆ2)w
L
2I w
L
1N = (1 + φˆ2 + φˆ4 + φˆ6)w
L
2I
wH2N = (1 + φˆ1 + φˆ2 + φˆ3)w
L
2I w
H
1N = (1 + φˆ1 + φˆ2 + φˆ3 + φˆ4 + φˆ5 + φˆ6 + φˆ7)w
L
2I
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We run a similar regression to estimate the flow of income among self-employed workers of
different skills and origins.
lnπl = κ+ κ1Hl + κ2Nl + κ3Hl ·Nl + κ4Ml + κ5Hl ·Ml + κ6Nl ·Ml + κ7Hl ·Nl ·Ml + ξl
We have the following relations from the above regression:
πL2I = (1 + κˆ− φˆ)w
L
2I π
L
1I = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ4)w
L
2I
πH2I = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ1)w
L
2I π
H
1I = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ1 + κˆ4 + κˆ5)w
L
2I
πL2N = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ2)w
L
2I π
L
1N = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ2 + κˆ4 + κˆ6)w
L
2I
πH2N = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ1 + κˆ2 + κˆ3)w
L
2I π
H
1N = (1 + κˆ− φˆ+ κˆ1 + κˆ2 + κˆ3 + κˆ4 + κˆ5 + κˆ6 + κˆ7)w
L
2I
Variable Paid Employment Self-employment
φˆ φˆ′ κˆ κˆ′
Constant 7.3188∗∗ 5.4306∗∗ 6.8037∗∗ 1.6244∗∗
High skill (H) +0.4108∗∗ +0.3481∗∗ +0.9945∗ +1.1058∗∗
Native (N) +0.2082∗∗ +0.1092∗∗ +0.6259 +0.6105
H ·N −0.0030 +0.0520 −0.5143 −0.6678
Manufacturing (M) +0.3211∗∗ +0.0713 +1.1351∗ +0.9720∗
H ·M −0.2692∗∗ −0.0985 −1.1984∗ −1.1288∗
N ·M −0.2314∗∗ −0.0438 −0.9208∗ −1.0429∗
H ·N ·M +0.2160∗ +0.0434 +0.8515 +1.0327
Male +0.4761∗∗ +0.8256∗∗
Age +0.0592∗∗ +0.1909∗∗
Age squared −0.0007∗∗ −0.0020∗∗
Tenure +0.0113∗∗ +0.0296∗∗
West +0.1597∗∗ +0.2843∗∗
Middle firm (20-200 employees) +0.2199∗∗ +0.1995
Large firm (200-2000 employees) +0.3383∗∗ −0.0168
Very large firm (> 2000 employees) +0.3612∗∗ −0.3260
R2 0.0875 0.4094 0.0321 0.3033
No. of observations 7443 7350 848 803
Table 4: Regression results, GSOEP 2008. Reference categories include Low skill, Immigrant,
Female workers employed in the East, in Services and Very small firms (less than 20 employees)
Parameter estimates from these regressions are given in table 4, where we use GSOEP in-
formation on gross wages and gross income of the self-employed. The first data column of this
table contains estimated parameters φˆ without controlling for individual characteristics. The
average skill premium is then about 41%, moreover the average wage discount of immigrant
workers is about 21%. The overall log wage gap of 0.21 is in line with reports in the literature
for Germany (it is 0.22 in Nanos and Schluter (2014) and 0.23 in Dustmann et al. (2010)). In
addition, workers employed in manufacturing earn 32% more compared to service workers. Not
surprising, these numbers are smaller when we control for individual heterogeneity of workers.
For example, the sector of production (parameter φ4) turns insignificant after we control for
the worker’s gender. This is because male workers are overrepresented in manufacturing jobs
(66%) and underrepresented in service jobs (only 42%). Thus our results indicate that there
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are no significant wage differences between workers with identical characteristics (e.g. two men
or two women) employed in manufacturing and services, but because of the gender wage gap
(48%)11 and due to the strong selection of male workers into manufacturing jobs and female
workers into service jobs there are large wage differences between the two sectors (32%). Given
that the purpose of our calibration is to capture average wage differences between worker groups
and production sectors rather than wage differences between observationally identical workers
in these sectors, in the following we use estimates φˆ and κˆ for our calibration.
Having obtained information on wages, we aim to uncover the underlying productivities of
workers pjy
i
jn. To do this we make use of the aggregate data on wages and GDP for Germany
in the year 2008 12. This data implies that the ratio between the average gross wage and GDP
in manufacturing is equal to 0.4894 whereas in services it is lower and equal to 0.3913. This
implies the following:
gi1N
gi1
wi1N +
gi1I
gi1
wi1I = 0.4894
(
gi1N
gi1
p1y
i
1N +
gi1I
gi1
p1y
i
1I
)
(22)
gi2N
gi2
wi2N +
gi2I
gi2
wi2I = 0.3913
(
gi2N
gi2
p2y
i
2N +
gi2I
gi2
p2y
i
2I
)
(23)
To estimate the remaining parameters βij and rK
i
j we need data on the tax rate and the unem-
ployment replacement rate in Germany. The average gross wage in our sample is equal to 2505
EUR, whereas the net wage after taxes and social contributions is equal to 1619 EUR. Hence we
set t = 1− 1619/2505 = 0.35 for all submarkets. Furthermore, we choose the net unemployment
benefit replacement rate equal to 0.445, so that bijn = 0.445w
i
jn(1 − t)
13. Consider submarket
i, j. In every submarket we have two equations for wages of immigrant and native workers given
by (16), one ratio between the average wage and the GDP given above (depending on the sector
and skill level of the submarket) and one free-entry condition. With these four equations we can
calibrate the two parameters βij and K
i
j in every submarket and two endogenous variables pjy
i
jI
and pjy
i
jN . We normalize the marginal product of low-skilled immigrant workers in services to
1, that is p2y
L
2I = 1. The values of parameters β
i
j and K
i
j are given in the following table:
Manufacturing Services
Low skill High skill Low skill High skill
βij 0.8706 0.6480 0.8037 0.2873
rKij 0.4678 0.5758 0.6361 0.8196
Table 5: Estimated parameter values for βij and K
i
j
Having estimated these parameters we can find values of productivities for paid workers
pjy
i
jn, gross wages w
i
jn and gross income of the self-employed agents pjπ
i
jn:
11The estimate of the gender wage gap is rather large in our regression due to the fact we combined full- and
part-time employees into one group for the purpose of calibration. Given that relatively many female workers
are part-time employed, the gender wage gap gets smaller but remains large and significant if we condition on
full-time employees.
12The data source is DESTATIS, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015: Fachserie 18 Reihe 1.2: Volkswirtschaftliche
Gesamtrechnungen
13DICE Database (2013), ”Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates, 1961 - 2011”, Ifo Institute, Munich.
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Manufacturing Services
Low skill High skill Low skill High skill
Immigr. Native Immigr. Native Immigr. Native Immigr. Native
pjy
i
jn 0.9390 0.9302 1.1314 1.1733 1.0000 1.0704 1.4537 1.4366
wijn 0.4629 0.4548 0.5120 0.5784 0.3503 0.4232 0.4962 0.5684
pjπ
i
jn 0.5694 0.4662 0.4974 0.5122 0.1716 0.3908 0.5223 0.5615
Table 6: Estimated values of endogenous variables pjy
i
jn, w
i
jn, pjπ
i
jn.
From the Nash bargaining solution we get the following equation for wages:
wijn(1− t) = β
i
j(1− t)(pjy
i
jn − rV
i
j ) + (1− β
i
j)P (rU
i
jn − α
i
jn(E
i
jn − U
i
jn))
From this equation one can see that βij is the relative weight on the net marginal productivity
(1 − t)(pjy
i
jn − rV
i
j ), while 1 − β
i
j is a weight on the reservation wage of the worker P (rU
i
jn −
αijn(E
i
jn − U
i
jn)) with the main component given by rU
i
jn. We find that β
i
j is relatively high
for low skill workers (see table 5), but it is low for high skill workers. Intuitively, this means
that outside opportunities are relatively unimportant for wages of low skill workers, but are
relevant for wages of the high skilled. So far there is little empirical evidence on the skill-specific
bargaining power. One exception is a study by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), who find
no significant power for intermediate and low skill workers and modestly positive bargaining
power for high skill workers in France. So there seem to be a contradiction between this study
and our findings. To reconcile our findings we want to note the following. Even though it is
intuitive to think that high skill workers possess more individual bargaining power than low
skill workers, one can not neglect the fact that low skill workers are more frequently represented
by trade unions, especially in Germany. So our results rather indicate the fact that collective
bargaining power is larger for low skill workers and so their wages are relatively close to their
marginal productivities, while individual outside opportunities are less important for low skill
workers. With respect to manufacturing one can even say that search frictions are irrelevant
for wages of low skill workers and can be well approximated by their marginal productivities.
On the contrary, high skill workers have lower collective bargaining power since their jobs are
less unionized, but they possess over moderate individual bargaining power, so that outside
opportunities in terms of finding jobs are stronger reflected in their wages.
4.3 Production function and preference parameters
As a benchmark production function we first consider the limiting case ρ→ 1, so the aggregate
production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Yj =
(
eLjI + ψ
L
jNe
L
jN + ϕ
L
jIs
L
jI + ϕ
L
jNs
L
jN
)χj(
eHjI + ψ
H
jNe
H
jN + ϕ
H
jIs
H
jI + ϕ
H
jNs
H
jN
)1−χj
A more general case with ρ > 1 is treated further in section 7. Let Γj be the ratio between the
high skill intermediate input and the low skilled, that is:
Γj =
eHjI + ψ
H
jNe
H
jN + ϕ
H
jIs
H
jI + ϕ
H
jNs
H
jN
eLjI + ψ
L
jNe
L
jN + ϕ
L
jIs
L
jI + ϕ
L
jNs
L
jN
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The marginal products of different worker groups are then given by:
yLjI = χj(Γj)
1−χj yHjI = (1− χj)(Γj)
−χj (24)
yLjN = χjψ
L
jN (Γj)
1−χj yHjN = (1− χj)ψ
H
jN (Γj)
−χj (25)
νLjn = χjϕ
L
jn(Γj)
1−χj νHjn = (1− χj)ϕ
H
jn(Γj)
−χj (26)
In this subsection we aim to estimate a vector of remaining parameters {χj , ϕ
i
jn, ψ
i
jN , a1, σ}. We
start by obtaining parameters of the production function. This goal can be achieved by using
equations (24)-(26) for the marginal productivities of paid workers pjy
i
jn and self-employed agents
pjv
i
jn. Recall that self-employed workers pay the flow cost rK
i
j depending on the submarket.
Thus their gross income (before taxes) can be written as πijn = pjν
i
jn − rK
i
j , which allows us to
find their marginal productivity pjν
i
jn. Then we can solve the system of 16 equations (24)-(26)
to identify 14 parameters {χj , ϕ
i
jn, ψ
i
jN} and two prices p1 and p2. This gives us p1 = 1.8395,
p2 = 2.4558, χ1 = 0.6973 and χ2 = 0.4054. The remaining 12 parameters are summarized in the
table below:
Manufacturing Services
Low skill High skill Low skill High skill
Immigr. Native Immigr. Native Immigr. Native Immigr. Native
ψijN – 0.9908 – 1.0371 – 1.0704 – 0.9882
ϕijn 1.1046 0.9946 0.9486 0.9617 0.8076 1.0269 0.9231 0.9501
Table 7: Estimated parameter values ψijN and ϕ
i
jn.
Based on the estimated parameters of the production function and the numbers of employed
workers we can find the model-implied fraction of services in the total GDP (p2Y2/(p1Y1+p2Y2)),
which is equal to 0.5949. The elasticity of substitution between manufactured goods and services
σ we set equal to 0.3 as in Pissarides and Ngai (2004). With these parameters and the aggregate
equilibrium condition C2 = Y2 we get:
0.5949 =
p2Y2
p1Y1 + p2Y2
=
p2
(
p2
a2
)−σ
p1
(
p1
a1
)−σ
+ p2
(
p2
a2
)−σ ⇒ a1 = 0.3517
Finally, we find that the lump-sum transfer from the budget, guaranteeing a balanced budget
constraint, is equal to T = 0.1387. Table 29 in the appendix contains a full list of all parameter
values that we use in the calibration and their explanations.
5 Results
5.1 Immigration inflow
In this section we analyze the effect of recent immigration on the German labour market. Figure
3 shows that the absolute number of immigrant workers was equal to 15566 thousands in 2008
which corresponds to the fraction 19% 14. It remained virtually unchanged in the years 2009
14This number includes foreign workers, individuals who acquired German citizenship at some point of their
life as well as their children. So it is higher than the fraction of immigrants in our sample since individuals having
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and 2010 but decreased sharply in 2011 reaching the level 14853 thousands. This is due to
the fact that some foreign workers came to Germany in the times of financial crisis but then
returned to their home countries. Since 2011 the number of immigrant workers was gradually
rising and reached the level 16386 thousands in 2014. Due to the large inflow of refugees, the
net inflow of immigrant workers in 2015 is equal to 1140 thousands15. Thus comparing the
lowest level in 2011 and the forecasted number for 2015 we get the rise in immigration equal to
(16386 + 1140 − 14853)/14853 = 18%. Given that the net immigration in 2016 is expected to
be positive, we consider a 20% increase in immigration in our analysis to include refugees and
other immigrant workers coming to Germany in 2016.
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Figure 3: Absolute numbers of immigrant workers (left scale) and their fraction as % of the
total population (right scale). Source: DESTATIS, Bevoelkerung mit Migrationshintergrund –
Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus, Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2
In terms of skills we will consider two scenarios – low skill immigration and a skill-neutral
inflow of immigrants. There are two reasons why we use these two scenarios. On the one hand,
reliable data on the skill composition of recent immigrants and refugees in Germany is not
available yet. On the other hand, many high skill immigrants are downgraded upon arrival and
apply for low skill jobs. Given this evidence (see Dustmann et al. (2013)) our two scenarios serve
as a lower and an upper bound on the real effect of immigration. In both scenarios the total
increase in the number of immigrant workers is set at 20%. Given that the absolute number of
immigrant workers is 1221 in our sample, in each of the two scenarios we add 244 immigrant
workers to the market. In the first scenario we perform a sector-neutral increase in immigration
and consider the situation when all new immigrant workers are low skilled. On the contrary,
in the second scenario we perform a 20% increase in immigration which is sector- and skill-
neutral. For every scenario, we will decompose the total effect on wages and unemployment in
the following way:
German citizenship from birth are classified as natives in our sample even if their parents had other nationality
but they are classified as individuals with immigration background in the official statistics.
15DESTATIS, Pressemitteilung Nr. 105 vom 21.03.2016
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• The effect of labour supply {u|y, v, p}. In this step we keep constant all productivities
yijn, vacancies v
i
j , prices pj and the lump-sum transfer T . Thus the only effect of immigra-
tion on unemployment in this step is due to the rise in the number of searching workers.
Thus we can evaluate, what will be the rise in unemployment of incumbent workers if they
are facing more competition in searching for jobs. If we increase the number of immi-
grants with a skill level i, then by construction there is no effect on workers of the opposite
skill level at this step. But it is likely to worsen the outside opportunities of unemployed
workers with a skill level i. So we expect a negative effect on their wages.
• The effect of productivity {u, y|v, p}. In this step we allow for a change in the marginal
productivities of workers yijn, as well as wages and unemployment but we keep constant
vacancies vij , prices pj and the lump-sum transfer T . We expect that a larger number
of workers with skill level i will reduce the marginal productivity of incumbent workers
with this skill level and increase the marginal productivity of workers with the opposite
skill level. Changes in productivities are translated into changes in wages. However, by
construction, there is no additional effect on unemployment at this step since the number
of vacancies remains unchanged.
• The effect of labour demand {u, y, v|p}. At this step we allow for endogenous vacancies
vij , productivities y
i
jn, wages and unemployment rates but we keep constant output prices
pj and the lump-sum transfer T . Consider a change in the number of type i immigrants.
On the one hand, if there is an increase in the number of workers, hiring becomes easier
for firms, which should lead to more vacancies. This is an outward shift of the Beveridge
curve. On the other hand, if employee’s productivity is falling due to immigration, this
will have a negative effect on profits, the number of vacancies and the market tightness.
In addition, there can be a positive spill-over from the labour market for workers of the
opposite skill level since their productivity is predicted to rise. So the overall effect on the
market tightness for type i workers is ambiguous.
• Aggregate supply and demand {u, y, v, p}. The only variable which remains fixed
at this step is the lump-sum transfer from the budget T . All other variables change
endogenously in response to an inflow of immigrant workers. On the one hand, many of
the immigrant workers will find jobs which is associated with a rise in total output supply.
However, this change is unlikely to be symmetric between the two sectors as low skill
workers are a dominant production factor in manufacturing, whereas high skill workers are
relatively more important in services. On the other hand, immigrant workers will have a
positive effect on the demand of both goods, which should have a positive effect on the
endogenous price p2.
5.2 Welfare calculation
Next we calculate welfare changes associated with a new wave of immigrants. Let Σijn denote
welfare of a person i, n in sector j. Each of the individuals can be either employed (with
probability eijn/g
i
jn), unemployed (with probability u
i
jn/g
i
jn) or self-employed (with probability
sijn/g
i
jn. The corresponding utilities are then [w
i
jn(1− t)+T ]/P , [b
i
jn+T ]/P and [π
i
jn(1− t)]/P .
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Hence the average welfare can be written as:
Σijn =
eijn[w
i
jn(1− t) + T ]
gijnP
+
uijn[b
i
jn + T ]
gijnP
+
sijn[π
i
jn(1− t) + T ]
gijnP
To measure aggregate welfare effects of immigration we define two new variables Σ and Σ˜.
Σ refers to ex-post welfare of a new representative worker based on the new distribution g˜ijn.
Whereas Σ˜ refers to ex-post welfare of a representative incumbent worker keeping the distribution
of workers across demographic groups gijn fixed. Given these definitions we get:
Σ = ΣL1Ig
L
1I +Σ
L
1Ng
L
1N +Σ
H
1Ig
H
1I +Σ
H
1Ng
H
1N +Σ
L
2Ig
L
2I +Σ
L
2Ng
L
2N +Σ
H
2Ig
H
2I +Σ
H
2Ng
H
2N
Σ˜ = ΣL1I g˜
L
1I +Σ
L
1N g˜
L
1N +Σ
H
1I g˜
H
1I +Σ
H
1N g˜
H
1N +Σ
L
2I g˜
L
2I +Σ
L
2N g˜
L
2N +Σ
H
2I g˜
H
2I +Σ
H
2N g˜
H
2N
If Σ0 denotes ex-ante welfare of a representative worker before the new wave of immigration,
then the change in welfare can be calculated as (Σ− Σ0)/Σ0 for the new representative worker
and (Σ˜− Σ0)/Σ0 for the representative incumbent worker. Note that these percentage changes
in welfare are identical to the equivalent variation (EV ) measure expressed as a percentage of
ex-ante income. This is because indirect utility can be expressed as real income, so that:
Ω(P0,M
0i
jn(1 + EV )) =
M0ijn(1 + EV )
P0
=
M1ijn
P1
= Ω(P1,M
1i
jn) ⇒ EV =
M1ijn/P1
M0ijn/P0
− 1
where M0ijn/P0 is the expected real income of worker {i, j, n} before the change and M
1i
jn/P1 is
the expected real income of this worker after the change.
Next we calculate the welfare of firms in every submarket i, j. Here we follow the approach
of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), who calculate the welfare of firms as a total number of new
hires (per period) multiplied by the present value of profits and minus the cost of capital:
λ(θij)u
i
jN︸ ︷︷ ︸
new hires of natives
·
[pjyijN − wijN − rKij
r + δ + αijN
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PV of profits by natives
+ λ(θij)u
i
jIh
i
jI︸ ︷︷ ︸
new hires of immigrants
·
[pjyijI − wijI − rKij
r + δ + αijI
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PV of profits by immigrants
− rKijv
i
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital cost
The first term in the above equation is a total number of hired native workers (per period)
multiplied by the present value of profits generated by these workers. The second term is a total
number of hired immigrant workers (per period) multiplied with their present value of profits.
Note that each of the two present values includes the capital cost −rKij . This is intuitive, since
in our model firms pay an upfront cost Kij upon the entry, but this is equivalent to paying a
flow cost −rKij in every period of time and in all states. Thus the flow cost −rK
i
j is paid by
filled jobs and open vacancies, which is the last term in the above expression. Rearranging this
expression we get:
vij
(
λ(θij)u
i
jNu
i
j
viju
i
j
[pjyijN − wijN − rKij
r + δ + αijN
]
+
λ(θij)u
i
jIh
i
jIu
i
j
viju
i
j
[pjyijI − wijI − rKij
r + δ + αijI
]
− rKij
)
= vij
(
q(θij)
uijN
uij
[pjyijN − wijN − rKij
r + δ + αijN
]
+ q(θij)h
i
jI
uijI
uij
[pjyijI − wijI − rKij
r + δ + αijI
]
− rKij
)
= 0
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The free-entry condition (10) implies that firms enter submarket {i, j} as long as expected
profits V ij are higher than the cost K
i
j , thus in the equilibrium the welfare of firms producing
intermediate goods is equal to zero. Finally, note that the profits of final goods producers are
also zero, because they pay the marginal product for all intermediate goods.
5.3 First scenario: low skill immigration
In this subsection we analyze the implications of a 20% rise in immigration, where all 244
new immigrant workers are low skilled. To keep the rise in immigration sector-neutral we
add 163 workers to the manufacturing sector and 81 workers to services, so the ratio remains
(585 + 163)/(293 + 81) ≈ 2. We conduct our analysis according to the aforementioned steps.
• In this step we analyze the implications of a change in labour supply, that is {u|y, v, p}.
The corresponding rows of table 9 show that there is a moderate rise in unemployment of
low skill workers since they are facing more competition for a fixed number of vacancies.
Immigrant low skill workers suffer a stronger increase in unemployment than native workers
especially in services, where the unemployment of low skill immigrant workers in increasing
from 20.73% to 21.47%. As expected worse outside opportunities are translated into lower
wages of low skill workers, but the effect is negligibly small. This is due to the high
bargaining power of low skill workers, which implies a much higher weight on the marginal
productivity rather than outside options.
• In this step we estimate the response of productivities, that is {u, y|v, p}. First, note that
there is no direct effect on unemployment since vacancies are still fixed and the change in
labour supply was already accounted for. As expected, low skill immigration leads to lower
productivity of low skill workers and a higher productivity of high skill workers. These
changes are translated into wages. Specifically, we find that high skill natives employed in
manufacturing gain most from low skill immigration at this step. Their wages are expected
to rise by 0.0266, which is approximately 4.6%.
• In the next step we allow for an endogenous response in vacancies, that is {u, y, v|p}. Due
to the higher productivity of high skill workers, firms expect higher profits and create
more vacancies, this is the job-creation effect of immigration. So the unemployment of
high skill workers falls, for example, the unemployment rate of high skill immigrants in
manufacturing is reduced from 18.56% down to 17.85%. Due to this effect, there is also a
positive spillover to the labour market for low skill workers: since there are more employed
high skill workers, the drop in the productivity of the low skilled is less pronounced. So
both worker types gain from a more intensive job-creation in the high skill sub-market. For
example, the rise in the unemployment rate of low skill immigrant workers in manufacturing
is reduced from +0.0060 in the first step down to only +0.0030 with the positive effect of
job creation. The effects on wages are rather small.
• In this step we analyze the implications of aggregate supply and demand in services, that
is {u, y, v, p}. On the one hand, a higher absolute number of employees leads to more
output in both production sectors. But at the same time, there is more internal demand
for services since low skill workers are the majority group and their wages rise in response
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to the high skill immigration. Taking both effects together we find that the price p2 is
increasing up to the level 2.5541. This means that the rise in total income is stronger than
the rise in service-output. Higher price p2 implies higher nominal productivity of workers,
which amplifies the positive job creation effect from the previous step. Unemployment of
all worker groups employed in services is falling compared to the pre-immigration level and
their nominal wages are increasing.
Finally, we also look at the profits of self-employed workers in response to a rise in p2. As
expected the profits of self-employed workers in services rise with natives benefiting more
than the immigrants. In manufacturing on the other hand low-skilled workers lose profits
with immigrants losing about 1.9% while natives losing about 2% of their profits. High
skilled workers in manufacturing seem to be gaining profits at this stage. The reason is
the fact that it is mainly the low skilled workers in manufacturing who’s productivity is
negatively affected by the influx of low-skilled immigrants. In services the rise in price and
demand makes up for the drop in productivity but in manufacturing the price is determined
on the international markets and remains unchanged, so the low-skilled workers observe a
decline in profits.
p2 θ
L
1 θ
H
1 θ
L
2 θ
H
2 T
u, y, v, p, T 2.554 0.0611 0.2729 0.0776 1.0502 0.1467
Table 8: Sector-specific variables, first scenario: low skill immigration
wL1I w
L
1N w
H
1I w
H
1N w
L
2I w
L
2N w
H
2I w
H
2N
0.4629 0.4547 0.5120 0.5784 0.3510 0.4239 0.4962 0.5684
u|y, v, p -0.0003 -0.0003 – – -0.0004 -0.0004 – –
u, y|v, p -0.0098 -0.0097 +0.0236 +0.0266 -0.0099 -0.0107 +0.0067 +0.0086
u, y, v|p -0.0094 -0.0094 +0.0245 +0.0270 -0.0100 -0.0109 +0.0082 +0.0096
u, y, v, p – – – – +0.0226 +0.0246 +0.0599 +0.0694
uL1I u
L
1N u
H
1I u
H
1N u
L
2I u
L
2N u
H
2I u
H
2N
0.1489 0.1367 0.1856 0.0688 0.2073 0.1312 0.1264 0.0358
u|y, v, p +0.0060 +0.0055 – – +0.0074 +0.0052 – –
u, y|v, p – – – – – – – –
u, y, v|p +0.0030 +0.0028 -0.0071 -0.0031 +0.0060 +0.0042 -0.0019 -0.0006
u, y, v, p – – – – -0.0093 -0.0064 -0.0119 -0.0037
πL1I π
L
1N π
H
1I π
H
1N π
L
2I π
L
2N π
H
2I π
H
2N
0.5694 0.4662 0.4974 0.5122 0.1716 0.3908 0.5223 0.5615
u, y, v, p -0.0106 -0.0097 +0.0252 +0.0256 +0.0197 +0.0251 +0.0703 +0.0723
ΣL1I Σ
L
1N Σ
H
1I Σ
H
1N Σ
L
2I Σ
L
2N Σ
H
2I Σ
H
2N
0.0977 0.0964 0.1019 0.1156 0.0787 0.0918 0.1032 0.1170
u, y, v, p|T -0.0036 -0.0035 +0.0009 +0.0012 +0.0011 +0.0013 +0.0062 +0.0075
u, y, v, p, T -0.0018 -0.0017 +0.0027 +0.0030 +0.0029 +0.0031 +0.0080 +0.0092
Table 9: First scenario: low skill immigration. This table shows absolute changes of endogenous
variables with the initial levels of each variable given in the first row.
The last rows of table 9 show changes in Σijn for all demographic groups. Low skill workers in
manufacturing lose welfare, since their unemployment rates are higher and their nominal wages
fall. In addition, higher price p2 reduces their level of consumption. Specifically, the drop in
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welfare of low skill workers is equal to 3.6 − 3.7%. All other demographic groups are gaining
from low skill immigration, even low skill workers employed in services because their income is
positively affected by the price p2. Based on the equations from section 5.2, we find that the
welfare rise of a representative incumbent worker is equal to 1.13% (see table 25). However,
taking into account that the share of low skill workers is increased after the change, the welfare
rise of a representative new worker is equal to 0.84%. However, these numbers are not the final
estimates of welfare. Indeed, there is a public surplus associated with higher wages of high skill
workers and their tax contributions. In order to balance the new public budget, we increase
the lump-sum transfer T up to the level 0.1467. This leads to higher welfare of all demographic
groups, so the average rise in welfare of incumbents is increased to 2.89% and the average welfare
of a new representative worker is equal to 2.60%. This information is summarized below:
Unbalanced budget Balanced budget
(T - fixed) (new T )
Welfare change (Σ− Σ0)/Σ0
(representative incumbent worker, gijn - fixed) +1.13% +2.89%
Welfare change (Σ˜− Σ0/Σ0) +0.84% +2.60%
(representative new worker, new gijn)
Table 10: Changes in aggregate welfare, first scenario: low skill immigration
5.4 Second scenario: Skill-neutral immigration
In this subsection we analyze the implications of a skill-neutral and a sector-neutral rise in
immigration. Thus we add 117 low skill immigrant workers to manufacturing, 29 high skill
immigrant workers to manufacturing, 58 low skill immigrant workers to services and 40 high
skill immigrant workers to services. The total rise in immigration is equal to 244 new workers
which guarantees the same distribution of immigrants across the four demographic groups. Table
10 shows the results for this experiment.
• First we analyze the response of the labour market to a labour supply shock {u|y, v, p}. An
increase in labour supply leads to higher unemployment and lower wages for all workers as
expected. Both for unemployment and wages immigrant workers lose more than natives as
a result of labour supply shock. High skilled immigrant workers in manufacturing observe
the highest rise in unemployment from 0.1856 to 0.1937 while high skilled immigrant
workers in services observe the highest decline in wages. The fact that wages of incumbent
immigrants are adversely affected by the new inflow of immigrant workers in Germany is
inline with the results of D’Amuri et al. (2010).
• Now we look at the response of productivities, {u, y|v, p}. We find that productivities
of low skill workers fall, whereas the productivities of high skill workers increase, both
effects being stronger in manufacturing, due to the fact that high skill workers are scarce
in manufacturing. This implies that wages of low skill workers fall further. Concerning
high skill workers, the drop in wages of high skill workers in services is mitigated, but the
first effect of higher labour supply is still dominating at this step. The situation is different
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for high skill workers in manufacturing, whose rise in productivity dominates the negative
effect of labour supply, so their wages rise. High skill native workers in manufacturing gain
the most as their wage increases by 0.0074 (+1.3%) while low skilled immigrant workers in
this sector lose the most in terms of wages as their wage falls by 0.0031 (−0.72%). Again
since we keep the number of vacancies fixed, no direct effect on unemployment is observed
at this stage.
• Next we analyze the situation with an endogenous response of vacancies {u, y, v|p}. As
explained in the previous step, the productivity of high skill workers rises, which stimu-
lates job-creation for high skill workers, especially in manufacturing. This leads to higher
wages of high skill workers, moreover, the initial rise in their unemployment is almost com-
pletely neutralized at this step. At the same time, higher employment of high skill workers
raises the productivity of low skill workers, so their productivity almost returns to the
pre-immigration level. Thus the rise in unemployment of the low-skilled associated with
larger labour supply is also almost neutralized at this step by the endogenous response in
vacancies.
• Next we investigate the consequences of a price change in services {u, y, v, p}. Job-creation
leads to higher output but at the same time higher demand is also observed as the number
of consumers increases due to higher number of immigrants in the economy. The higher
demand clearly dominates the higher output effect and leads to an increase in the price
p2. The new price in services is p2 = 2.5166 which is about 2.5% higher than the pre-
immigration level. A higher price implies a higher nominal productivity of workers in
services and this is also reflected in the wages and unemployment of workers in this sector.
The wages in this sector rise while unemployment is falling.
The profits of all self-employed workers rise at this stage except low skilled workers in
manufacturing. Self-employed workers in services gain from the rise in the price p2, which
increases the profits. But in manufacturing the decline in the marginal productivity of low
skill workers reduces their profits from self-employment.
p2 θ
L
1 θ
H
1 θ
L
2 θ
H
2 T
u, y, v, p, T 2.5166 0.0631 0.2530 0.0764 0.9526 0.1437
Table 11: Sector-specific variables, second scenario: skill-neutral immigration
Finally, we consider welfare changes with the unbalanced budget (that is, T = 0.1388 which
is the pre-immigration level). We observe that workers in services gain from skill-neutral immi-
gration because of the higher price p2. Workers in manufacturing on the other hand face losses.
Overall, there is a small welfare gain from 0.1021 to 0.1027 across groups with unbalanced bud-
get, which is +0.55%. When we balance the budget then the new lump-sum transfer is equal
to 0.1437. This has a positive effect on the welfare of all worker groups as all groups experience
a gain in the welfare, while low skilled workers in manufacturing witness a decline in their loss
compared to the unbalanced budget. Both native and immigrant workers move from −0.0017
with unbalanced budget to −0.0006 welfare loss with balanced budget. For the overall welfare
with a balanced budget we observe that it is increasing up to +1.65% for new representative
worker and by +1.83% for an incumbent worker.
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wL1I w
L
1N w
H
1I w
H
1N w
L
2I w
L
2N w
H
2I w
H
2N
0.4629 0.4547 0.5119 0.5783 0.3510 0.4239 0.4973 0.5697
u|y, v, p -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0037 -0.0020
u, y|v, p -0.0031 -0.0030 +0.0055 +0.0074 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0030 -0.0012
u, y, v|p -0.0026 -0.0025 +0.0064 +0.0071 -0.0018 -0.0018 +0.0010 +0.0014
u, y, v, p – – – – +0.0189 +0.0206 +0.0323 +0.0378
uL1I u
L
1N u
H
1I u
H
1N u
L
2I u
L
2N u
H
2I u
H
2N
0.1490 0.1368 0.1856 0.0688 0.2073 0.1313 0.1264 0.0358
u|y, v, p +0.0042 +0.0039 +0.0081 +0.0036 +0.0055 +0.0037 +0.0055 +0.0017
u, y|v, p – – – – – – – –
u, y, v|p +0.0008 +0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0004 +0.0016 +0.0010 +0.0003 +0.0001
u, y, v, p – – – – -0.0079 -0.0055 -0.0144 -0.0020
πL1I π
L
1N π
H
1I π
H
1N π
L
2I π
L
2N π
H
2I π
H
2N
0.5694 0.4660 0.4973 0.5121 0.3916 0.3908 0.5236 0.5628
u, y, v, p -0.0030 -0.0026 +0.0068 +0.0069 +0.0159 +0.0210 +0.0379 +0.0389
ΣL1I Σ
L
1N Σ
H
1I Σ
H
1N Σ
L
2I Σ
L
2N Σ
H
2I Σ
H
2N
0.0977 0.0964 0.1019 0.1156 0.0787 0.0918 0.1033 0.1170
u, y, v, p|T -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0007 +0.0014 +0.0015 +0.0031 +0.0039
u, y, v, p, T -0.0006 -0.0006 +0.0004 +0.0005 +0.0025 +0.0026 +0.0043 +0.0051
Table 12: Second scenario: skill-neutral immigration. This table shows absolute changes of
endogenous variables with the initial levels of each variable given in the first row.
Unbalanced budget Balanced budget
(T - fixed) (new T )
Welfare change (Σ− Σ0)/Σ0
(representative incumbent worker, gijn - fixed) +0.72% +1.83%
Welfare change (Σ˜− Σ0/Σ0) +0.55% +1.65%
(representative new worker, new gijn)
Table 13: Changes in aggregate welfare, second scenario: skill neutral immigration
5.5 Self-employment: Necessity or Opportunity?
In this subsection we analyze value changes of workers associated with self-employment: Eijn −
U ijn and W
i
jn − E
i
jn. Initially we didn’t put any restrictions on the signs of these variables, so
they can be positive or negative. For example, if we find that W ijn−E
i
jn < 0, this indicates that
workers are forced to enter entrepreneurship since their former state is not available anymore.
Alternatively, if W ijn − E
i
jn > 0, this indicates a profitable opportunity, which workers use in
order to increase their income. Value changes W ijn−U
i
jn and E
i
jn−U
i
jn can be found as follows:
W ijn − U
i
jn =
wijn(1− t)− b
i
jn
P (r + δ + hijnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn)
Eijn − U
i
jn =
πijn(1− t)− b
i
jn
P (r + γ + αijn)
− hijnλ(θ
i
j)
(W ijn − U
i
jn)
r + γ + αijn
Resulting present values U ijn (blue), E
i
jn (red) and W
i
jn (green) are illustrated on figure 4.
First note that W ijn > U
i
jn for all worker groups, which means that employed workers have
higher present values than unemployed workers. Consider first sector 1 (manufacturing). We
find that low skill workers gain value from starting their own business, especially immigrant
workers (EL1I > W
L
1I > U
L
1I). For high skill workers the situation is somewhat different since
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WH1n > E
H
1n > U
H
1n. This means that high skill workers are generally better off in paid employment
but would prefer self-employment as an alternative to unemployment. Overall, one can see
that there is small heterogeneity in the present values of workers in sector 1. Next consider
sector 2 (services). Here we find much stronger heterogeneity in present values, with low skill
immigrants being the category with lowest values. Native workers in services prefer to be
regularly employed but self-employment is better for them than unemployment. The situation
is different for immigrant workers with high skilled preferring self-employment to any other state
and low skilled being worst off in self-employment. This latter result, however, should be taken
with care since the number of low skilled immigrant workers in services is very small in our
sample, which could bias the result. Overall, one can conclude that high skill immigrant workers
gain from self-employment in service occupations, while low skill immigrant workers gain from
self-employment if manufacturing.
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Figure 4: Present values U ijn, E
i
jn and W
i
jn for all worker groups
6 Extensions and counterfactual evidence
6.1 Equal employment opportunities
In this subsection we construct a counterfactual economy where both native and immigrant
workers have equal hiring chances, formally we set hijn = 1 in all submarkets. This case is
important because it is possible that immigrant workers are underutilized in Germany in terms
of their productive potential. So this case will allow us to estimate the effect of hiring equality
on wages, prices and welfare of workers across different groups. In reality, this step could take
the form of an easier access to language and integration courses, easier application process for
recognizing foreign diplomas and/or anti-discrimination policies (see Kaas and Manger (2012)
for an experiment on hiring discrimination in Germany). Further, we shall only consider the
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model with existing immigrants and not extend it by introducing immigration shocks as the idea
of this exercise is to see the implications of equal employment opportunities among natives and
immigrants on labour market and welfare rather than effects of immigration shocks.
Our results with hijn = 1 in all submarkets are shown in Table 15. To understand the results,
note that hL1I = 0.9120, which is very close to 1, whereas all other h
i
jn variables are rather
small. This means that low skill immigrant workers have similar employment chances as native
workers in manufacturing, but their chances are much lower in the other three submarkets.
Hence increasing hijn up to 1 has a strong positive effect on wages of immigrant workers but
a negative effect on wages of native workers in all submarkets except low skill manufacturing
jobs. This is because more equal employment chances give more effective bargaining power to
immigrant workers which improves their wages. But on the other hand, higher employment in
a given worker group reduces the productivity of all workers in this group which leads to lower
wages of native workers. The situation is different in the low skill manufacturing submarket.
The productivity of these workers rises due to a higher employment of high skill workers. Thus
both native and immigrant low skill workers in manufacturing gain from this policy.
Even though the effects on wages have different signs, we find that all worker groups gain in
terms of lower unemployment. Unemployment of immigrant workers falls down to the same level
as unemployment of native workers. But the unemployment rate of native workers also falls.
This is because easier hiring is beneficial for firms and intensifies the process of job creation,
so there are more vacancies, which has a positive indirect effect on the employment chances of
native workers. Concerning self-employed, the corresponding row for profits shows that only
low skilled self-employed workers in manufacturing gain from the considered policy regardless of
their origin. All other groups of self-employed workers observe moderate profit losses.
p2 θ
L
1 θ
H
1 θ
L
2 θ
H
2 T
u, y, v, p, T 2.4469 0.0650 0.2616 0.0705 0.9052 0.1407
Table 14: Equal employment opportunities
wL1I w
L
1N w
H
1I w
H
1N w
L
2I w
L
2N w
H
2I w
H
2N
0.4629 0.4547 0.5119 0.5783 0.3510 0.4239 0.4973 0.5697
u, y, v, p +0.0040 +0.0034 +0.0165 -0.0088 +0.0004 -0.0043 +0.0819 -0.0028
uL1I u
L
1N u
H
1I u
H
1N u
L
2I u
L
2N u
H
2I u
H
2N
0.1490 0.1368 0.1856 0.0688 0.2073 0.1313 0.1264 0.0358
u, y, v, p -0.0125 -0.0013 -0.1184 -0.0016 -0.0758 -0.0005 -0.0916 -0.0011
πL1I π
L
1N π
H
1I π
H
1N π
L
2I π
L
2N π
H
2I π
H
2N
0.5694 0.4660 0.4973 0.5121 0.3916 0.3908 0.5236 0.5628
u, y, v, p +0.0038 +0.0035 -0.0090 -0.0091 -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0045
ΣL1I Σ
L
1N Σ
H
1I Σ
H
1N Σ
L
2I Σ
L
2N Σ
H
2I Σ
H
2N
0.0977 0.0964 0.1019 0.1156 0.0787 0.0918 0.1033 0.1170
u, y, v, p|T +0.0012 +0.0007 +0.0071 -0.0009 +0.0025 -0.0004 +0.0140 -0.0001
u, y, v, p, T +0.0017 +0.0012 +0.0076 -0.0005 +0.0029 0.0000 +0.0145 +0.0003
Table 15: Equal employment opportunities. This table shows absolute changes of endogenous
variables with the initial levels of each variable given in the first row.
Finally, we analyze the impact of equal opportunities policy with both unbalanced and
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balanced budget. The new value for lump-sum transfers with hijn = 1 is equal to T = 0.1407. But
we shall first analyze the impact with unbalanced budget. The row for welfare with unbalanced
budget {u, y, v, p|T} shows that all native workers except low skilled in manufacturing observe
very small welfare losses due to lower wages while all immigrant workers and low skilled natives in
manufacturing gain in terms of welfare. The overall welfare gain prior to the fiscal adjustment is
equal to +0.5%. Once we allow for a balanced budget {u, y, v, p, T} the losses that native workers
observe with unbalanced budget either disappear or get lower. Low skilled natives in services,
for example, observe no impact on their welfare whereas it was negative with an unbalanced
budget. Similarly we notice that the welfare loss of high-skilled natives in manufacturing is
reduced from −0.0009 to −0.0005. All immigrant workers, on the other hand, experience a
further gain in welfare from the redistribution. The overall welfare gain with a balanced budget
is equal to +0.9%. This shows that productive abilities of immigrant workers are not fully
utilized in Germany and there is room for a moderate welfare improvement due to the equal
opportunities policy.
6.2 Unemployment benefits
In the benchmark model presented above we assumed that nominal unemployment benefits
bijn remained fixed and unchanged after the influx of immigrants. This could be the case for
long term unemployed receiving unemployment assistance, but it is not a realistic assumption
for the short term unemployed, since their benefits are closely linked to their wages prior to
unemployment. In this subsection we analyze the opposite extreme case, when unemployment
benefits are proportional to former wages. In order to achieve this goal we set a fixed replacement
rate for all worker groups equal to z, that is: bijn = zw
i
jn(1− t). With this modification equation
(16) can be rewritten as:
wijn =
βij(pjy
i
jn − rV
i
j )(r + δ + h
i
jnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn)
(r + δ + αijn)(1− (1− β)z) + β
i
jh
i
jnλ(θ
i
j)
Using these equations and z = 0.445 produces the same benchmark equilibrium as before.
However, the new equilibrium after the inflow of immigrant workers will be different, since
nominal unemployment benefits are now endogenous. We focus on the case of a skill- and
sector-neutral rise in immigration equal to 20% to guarantee that our results are comparable
with the second experiment above. These results are summarized in tables 16-17 below:
p2 θ
L
1 θ
H
1 θ
L
2 θ
H
2 T
u, y, v, p, T 2.5291 0.0633 0.2508 0.0743 0.9137 0.1442
Table 16: Sector-specific variables, second scenario, proportional unemployment benefits
Proportional unemployment benefits amplify any initial change in wages. For example, one
can see from table 17 that all worker groups with the exception of low skill workers in sector 1,
get higher nominal wages after the inflow of immigrants. This is because any increase in wages
stemming from higher productivity leads to higher unemployment benefits, which improves the
bargaining position of workers and reinforces the rise in wages. Higher wages are beneficial for
workers but not for firms. Specifically, the market tightness of high skill workers in sector 2 (θH2 )
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wL1I w
L
1N w
H
1I w
H
1N w
L
2I w
L
2N w
H
2I w
H
2N
0.4629 0.4547 0.5120 0.5784 0.3510 0.4239 0.4962 0.5684
u, y, v, p -0.0028 -0.0028 +0.0072 +0.0078 +0.0246 +0.0265 +0.0408 +0.0450
uL1I u
L
1N u
H
1I u
H
1N u
L
2I u
L
2N u
H
2I u
H
2N
0.1489 0.1367 0.1856 0.0688 0.2073 0.1312 0.1264 0.0358
u, y, v, p +0.0005 +0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0039 -0.0056 -0.0042 -0.0013
ΣL1I Σ
L
1N Σ
H
1I Σ
H
1N Σ
L
2I Σ
L
2N Σ
H
2I Σ
H
2N
0.0977 0.0964 0.1019 0.1156 0.0787 0.0918 0.1032 0.1170
u, y, v, p|T -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0009 +0.0020 +0.0022 +0.0041 +0.0046
u, y, v, p, T -0.0009 -0.0008 +0.0005 +0.0004 +0.0033 +0.0035 +0.0054 +0.0059
Table 17: Worker-specific variables, second scenario, proportional unemployment benefits. This
table shows absolute changes of endogenous variables with the initial levels of each variable given
in the first row.
has a more moderate increase up to the level 0.9137 compared to the case of fixed unemployment
benefits, where it is rising up to 0.9525 in response to the skill- and sector-neutral immigration.
This negative effect of proportional unemployment benefits on the job creation implies that the
rise in output Y2 is overcompensated by the rise in the total income of workers. So the price
of services p2 increases stronger and is now equal to 2.5291, while it was 2.5166 in the setting
with fixed unemployment benefits. Higher price p2 is beneficial for all workers employed in
services, also low skill workers. On the other hand, it is harmful for low skill workers employed
in manufacturing since their consumption and therefore welfare are both reduced. Nevertheless,
table 17 shows that the overall welfare of workers increases in response to the immigration and
the average welfare gain for the same T = 0.1388 is equal to 0.93% for the average incumbent
worker and 0.76% for the new representative worker.
Unbalanced budget Balanced budget
(T - fixed) (new T )
Welfare change (Σ− Σ0)/Σ0
(representative incumbent worker, gijn - fixed) +0.93% +2.16%
Welfare change (Σ˜− Σ0/Σ0) +0.76% +1.98%
(representative new worker, new gijn)
Table 18: Changes in aggregate welfare, second scenario: proportional unemployment benefits
Next we consider the implications of immigration for the public budget. On the one hand,
unemployment benefits rise in response to higher wages, which is an additional burden for the
budget, but on the other hand, higher wages, especially in service occupations, lead to higher
tax contributions and reduce the pressure on public finances. Overall, we find that both effects
neutralize each other and public expenditures increase to the level T = 0.1442, which is only
slightly more than 0.1436 in the setting with fixed unemployment benefits. Taking into account
this rise in public expenditures, the overall effect from immigration is increased to 2.16% for the
average incumbent worker and 1.98% for the new representative worker. Comparing 1.98% with
1.63% in the case of fixed benefits, we conclude that proportional unemployment benefits amplify
the positive effect of skill- and sector-neutral immigration reported in the previous section.
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7 Alternative calibrations
7.1 CES production technology
In this subsection we consider a different calibration of our model with a more general CES
production function as described in section 2. Specifically, we take the elasticity of substitution
between different skill groups of labour in Germany from the recent study by D’Amuri et al.
(2010). They find that 1/ρ = 0.34 (ρ = 2.94), thus the Cobb-Douglas production function
implies a lower elasticity of substitution between high and low skill labour compared to the one
observed empirically for Germany. In order to address this issue and obtain more precise esti-
mates for the effect of immigration, we deviate from the Cobb-Douglas specification and perform
a new calibration of our model with ρ = 2.94. All other transition parameters {r, γ, δ, αijn η, λ0},
frictional parameters {βij ,K
i
j , b
i
jn, t} as well as nominal wages, productivities, profits from self-
employment and public expenditures {wijn, pjy
i
jn, π
i
jn, T} remain the same as in the benchmark
calibration. In addition, since variables ψijN and φ
i
jn reflect ratios between productivities of
respective worker groups and productivities of immigrant workers in these groups, these param-
eters also remain unchanged. The only change in terms of model calibration refers to the two
parameters of the production function χ1 and χ2, the corresponding fixed price p1, as well as
the share of good 1 in total consumption a1. Setting, ρ = 2.94 and using the new productivity
equations from section 3 we find the following:
χ1 χ2 p1 a1
0.5389 0.4071 1.9853 0.3123
Table 19: New calibrated parameters with the CES production function
Next we set these parameter values and document the implications of a skill-neutral and
sector-neutral 20% rise in immigration (second scenario) with a CES production function. Our
results are documented in tables 20-21.
p2 θ
L
1 θ
H
1 θ
L
2 θ
H
2 T
u, y, v, p, T 2.5154 0.0634 0.2495 0.0776 0.9407 0.1436
Table 20: Sector-specific variables, second scenario, CES production function
wL1I w
L
1N w
H
1I w
H
1N w
L
2I w
L
2N w
H
2I w
H
2N
0.4618 0.4546 0.5121 0.5786 0.3514 0.4245 0.4964 0.5688
u, y, v, p -0.0010 -0.0010 +0.0024 +0.0027 +0.0216 +0.0235 +0.0295 +0.0345
uL1I u
L
1N u
H
1I u
H
1N u
L
2I u
L
2N u
H
2I u
H
2N
0.1489 0.1367 0.1856 0.0688 0.2071 0.1311 0.1266 0.0358
u, y, v, p +0.0003 +0.0003 +0.0003 +0.0001 -0.0091 -0.0062 -0.0059 -0.0019
ΣL1I Σ
L
1N Σ
H
1I Σ
H
1N Σ
L
2I Σ
L
2N Σ
H
2I Σ
H
2N
0.0953 0.0940 0.0993 0.1128 0.0768 0.0895 0.1005 0.1140
u, y, v, p|T -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0013 +0.0017 +0.0019 +0.0027 +0.0033
u, y, v, p, T -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0002 +0.0028 +0.0030 +0.0038 +0.0045
Table 21: Worker-specific variables, second scenario, CES production function. This table shows
absolute changes of endogenous variables with the initial levels of each variable given in the first
row.
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These tables reveal the following. If the elasticity of substitution between high and low skill
workers is larger (ρ = 2.94 > 1) it is easier to substitute workers with different skills for each
other. Table 21 shows that this change is beneficial for the low skilled and costly for the high
skilled. For example, the rise in wages of all high skill workers is mitigated, whereas the rise in
wages of the low skilled in services is amplified. As before, the only group of workers losing from
immigration are the low skill workers employed in sector 1 (manufacturing), however the drop in
their wages is weaker with a higher elasticity of substitution. When considering welfare, we can
see that the increase in the price of services p2 is similar to the case of a Cobb-Douglas production
function. This rise in prices eliminates the welfare gain of high skill workers in manufacturing,
so only workers supplying services gain from immigration in terms of welfare. Nevertheless, the
overall welfare gain from immigration is positive and equal to 0.71% and 0.53% for the incumbent
and new representative worker respectively when public expenditure T is fixed. Allowing for the
adjustment in the public budget we find that T increases to the level 0.1436 due to higher taxes.
This raises the total welfare gain from immigration to the level 1.82% and 1.64% depending on
the reference group. Thus the overall welfare gain remains the same with the CES production
technology.
Unbalanced budget Balanced budget
(T - fixed) (new T )
Welfare change (Σ− Σ0)/Σ0
(representative incumbent worker, gijn - fixed) +0.71% +1.82%
Welfare change (Σ˜− Σ0/Σ0) +0.53% +1.64%
(representative new worker, new gijn)
Table 22: Changes in aggregate welfare, second scenario: CES production function
7.2 Robustness with respect to σ
In this subsection we consider another calibration of our model with σ = 0.1. Elasticity of sub-
stitution σ is a preference parameter and so it is difficult to estimate this parameter empirically.
Ngai and Pissarides (2004) conclude that [0.1...0.3] is the most realistic range for this parameter.
Since σ = 0.3 is our benchmark parameter value, in this subsection we consider the lower limit
and set σ = 0.1. Changing the elasticity of substitution, implies a lower value of a1 = 0.22 but
there are no other changes in the parameters. Table 24 shows our new results for the skill- and
sector-neutral 20% increase in immigration. A rise in immigration leads to higher output on the
one hand, while on the other hand a rise in demand is also observed. This leads to a stronger
rise in the price for services, p2 = 2.5651 as higher output does not seem to compensate for high
demand so the market for services clears at a higher price. This is intuitive because 1/σ is the
elasticity of the relative price p2/p1 with respect to the relative output Y2/Y1. With σ = 0.1, this
elasticity is increased to 10, which means that the relative price p2/p1 becomes more sensitive
to changes in the relative output Y2/Y1. A stronger increase in the price of services implies
that wages of workers employed in services rise stronger compared to the benchmark case with
σ = 0.3. Also unemployment of these workers falls stronger. But wages and unemployment of
workers employed in manufacturing remain the same as in the benchmark case since they are
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not directly affected by the price p2.
p2 θ
L
1 θ
H
1 θ
L
2 θ
H
2 T
u, y, v, p, T 2.5651 0.0631 0.2530 0.0830 1.0337 0.1482
Table 23: Alternative calibration with σ = 0.1
wL1I w
L
1N w
H
1I w
H
1N w
L
2I w
L
2N w
H
2I w
H
2N
0.4629 0.4547 0.5119 0.5783 0.3520 0.4251 0.4989 0.5715
u, y, v, p -0.0026 -0.0025 +0.0064 +0.0071 + 0.0345 +0.0375 +0.0558 +0.0650
uL1I u
L
1N u
H
1I u
H
1N u
L
2I u
L
2N u
H
2I u
H
2N
0.1490 0.1368 0.1856 0.0688 0.2069 0.1310 0.1260 0.0357
u, y, v, p +0.0008 +0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0143 -0.0010 -0.0107 -0.0034
πL1I π
L
1N π
H
1I π
H
1N π
L
2I π
L
2N π
H
2I π
H
2N
0.5694 0.4660 0.4973 0.5121 0.1732 0.3927 0.5255 0.5648
u, y, v, p -0.0030 -0.0026 +0.0068 +0.0069 +0.0289 +0.0369 +0.0649 +0.0667
ΣL1I Σ
L
1N Σ
H
1I Σ
H
1N Σ
L
2I Σ
L
2N Σ
H
2I Σ
H
2N
0.0984 0.0971 0.1026 0.1164 0.0794 0.0926 0.1042 0.1181
u, y, v, p|T -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0018 -0.0019 +0.0026 +0.0029 +0.0054 +0.0066
u, y, v, p, T -0.0007 -0.0007 +0.0003 +0.0002 +0.0046 +0.0050 +0.0075 +0.0087
Table 24: Alternative calibration with σ = 0.1. This table shows absolute changes of endogenous
variables with the initial levels of each variable given in the first row.
Next we analyze the effect of skill-neutral immigration on welfare in the new setting with
σ = 0.1. The new value of T is equal to 0.1391. The change in welfare with an unbalanced
budget is given in row {u, y, v, p|T}. It appears that all workers in manufacturing lose welfare
as a result of higher price p2 while all workers in services gain in terms of welfare. The average
welfare gain at this step is equal to +1.86%. However the increase in immigration will also
change the lumps-sum transfer made to each worker in the economy to balance the new budget.
Workers employed in services pay higher taxes which leads to the surplus of the public budget,
so that T = 0.1482. With this transfer all the workers experience a rise in welfare except the low
skilled working in manufacturing who still observe a loss in welfare. But this loss is considerably
reduced compared to the one with unbalanced budget. The high skilled natives in services benefit
most as their welfare rise is given by 7.5%. The overall average gain in welfare is about +3.9%
for new representative worker while +4.1% for an incumbent worker with balanced budget.
This experiment shows that more sensitive prices of services produce larger welfare benefits for
workers employed in this sector. So the overall welfare rise is stronger with more sensitive prices.
Thus our benchmark case with a total welfare gain equal to +1.65% for a new representative
worker is a conservative estimate of the skill-neutral immigration in Germany.
8 Conclusion
In this study we explored the effects of immigration on the German labour market using a search
and matching framework. Within this framework we analyzed the welfare effects of immigration
on consumers in Germany. We developed a model with two sectors of production – manufacturing
and services – and workers heterogeneous in their skills (low or high), origin (native or immigrant)
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Unbalanced budget Balanced budget
(T - fixed) (new T )
Welfare change (Σ− Σ0)/Σ0
(representative incumbent worker, gijn - fixed) +2.1% +4.1%
Welfare change (Σ˜− Σ0/Σ0) +1.86% +3.9%
(representative new worker, new gijn)
Table 25: Changes in aggregate welfare, second scenario:σ = 0.1
and the production sector. There are four submarkets where four types of intermediate goods
are produced. In each final good sector the low and high skilled intermediate goods are combined
to produce the final good using CES production technology. Our model differs from the existing
literature as it includes self-employment as an alternative occupational possibility for workers.
Our model also considers redistribution policy to capture the impact of immigration on the public
budget. We assume that manufactured goods are traded on international markets and keep the
price in manufacturing fixed. In contrast, the price in services is endogenously determined within
the model since services are consumed domestically to a large extent.
For the calibration of parameters we used GSOEP data from 2008 as well as aggregate
macroeconomic indicators. We simulated the model to analyze the implications of a 20% increase
in immigration observed in Germany in the period 2008-2016. Our results show that the overall
welfare effect of immigration is positive and estimated at +1.6%. Considering separate groups,
only low skill workers in manufacturing have a slight drop in welfare (−0.6%). All other worker
groups, especially, high skill workers in services gain from immigration. This effect is driven
by higher internal demand for services, which leads to higher prices of services. The gains of
workers employed in service jobs are partially redistributed through the tax system and reduce
welfare losses of low skill workers in manufacturing.
We also performed several extensions of our model to analyze the effects of proportional
unemployment benefits and equal employment opportunities between natives and immigrants.
Our results show that unemployment benefits proportional to wages amplify the positive effect
of immigration. Similarly, equal employment opportunities also enhance the positive effects of
immigration by allowing to fully utilize productive abilities of immigrants. In both extensions
we observe an increase in welfare compared to the benchmark case. One policy recommendation
that emerges from our study is that creating equal employment opportunities among natives
and immigrants could generate a welfare gain.
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11 Appendix
Proof for the Nash Bargaining Solution
The first order condition of the Nash maximization problem is given by:
βij(1− t)(J
i
jn − V
i
j ) = (1− β
i
j)P (W
i
jn − U
i
jn)
Inserting rU ijn into the equation for W
i
jn − U
i
jn we get:
W ijn − U
i
jn =
[wijn(1− t)− b
i
jn]/P
r + αijn + δ + h
i
jnλ(θ
i
j)
Inserting this rent into the first order condition we get:
βij(1− t)
pjy
i
jn − w
i
jn − rV
i
j
r + δ + αijn
= (1− βij)
[wijn(1− t)− b
i
jn]/P
r + αijn + δ + h
i
jnλ(θ
i
j)
Rewriting this equation and expressing wijn gives us the final equation:
wijn =
βij(pjy
i
jn − rV
i
j )(r + δ + h
i
jnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn) + (1− β
i
j)(r + δ + α
i
jn)b
i
n/(1− t)
r + δ + βijh
i
jnλ(θ
i
j) + α
i
jn
Definition of variables and data description
Our definition of the immigrant status is based on variables yp137 (German nationality) and yp139
(German nationality since birth). Only if both variables take value 1 we classify the individual as a
native (. Otherwise the person is assigned an immigrant status. Thus our definition of immigrants includes
individuals with foreign citizenship (1144) and those who changed their citizenship for the German one at
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some later stage in their life (921). The definition of self-employment is based on variables yp4602a (Self-
employed farmer), yp4602b (Free-Lance professional), yp4602c (Other self-employed), yp4602d (Family
member working for relative). If one of these variables has a positive answer, the person is assigned to self-
employment (1194). The definition of unemployment is based on variable yp15 (Registered unemployed).
The individual is classified as unemployed if yp15 takes value 1 (1183). Our definition of employment
is based on variable yp19 (Gainfully employed). Thus workers are classified as employed if they are
full-time employed or regularly part-time employed and havn’t been classified as self-employed (8699).
Thus we exclude workers in military or community services, workers on vocational training and those
with zero working hours near retirement. The skill level of workers is based on variable ybilzeit, which
takes values between 7 and 18. Low skill workers are those with schooling less or equal to 12 years
(12788), workers with more schooling years are classified as high skilled. The sector of production is
based on variable e1110608. Sector 1 includes Agriculture, Energy, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction
and Trade, whereas Sector 2 includes Transportation, Banking, Insurance and Other services. Sector
information for unemployed workers is recovered from their jobs in the previous 5 years (2003-2008)
based on variables e1110607, e1110606, e1110605, e1110604, e1110603. To avoid a possible bias we don’t
delete observations with missing sector information, rather we apply the fractions of workers employed
in sectors 1 and 2 respectively to all workers classified as employed, so their total number remains the
same. We apply the same procedure to unemployed and self-employed workers.
Low skill High skill Total
Obs sLjn e
L
jn u
L
jn s
H
jn e
H
jn u
H
jn 11075
Manufacturing
Native 317 2558 456 150 929 80 4491
Immigrant 30 469 87 20 97 27 729
Services
Native 195 2119 350 441 2162 97 5363
Immigrant 9 222 61 32 142 25 492
Table 26: Sample Profile: Source Socio-Economic Panel 2008, Germany
Sector 1 Sector 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
Agriculture 1 129 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 135
Energy 2 0 102 0 5 1 0 0 0 1 109
Mining 3 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
Manufacturing 4 1 0 1 1618 23 15 2 2 29 1691
Construction 5 0 0 1 21 1052 13 5 4 8 1104
Trade 6 1 1 0 11 11 1372 9 2 41 1448
Transport 7 0 1 0 5 7 7 463 1 9 493
Bank, Insurance 8 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 404 2 408
Other services 9 1 1 0 17 14 33 11 13 4170 4260
Table 27: Industry transition matrix in Germany, 2007-2008
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Unemployed Open Unemployment Employed Vacancy
Year workers vacancies duration workers duration
ut vt in weeks (in days)
2001 3852564 434037 38.3 39485000 46
2002 4061345 374963 37.6 39257000 56
2003 4376795 269836 37.4 38918000 51
2004 4381281 206850 38.1 39034000 41
2005 4493000 255758 38.4 38976000 43
2006 4106697 354288 40.1 39192000 53
2007 3760076 423440 45.6 39857000 65
2008 3258453 389048 42.1 40348000 64
2009 3414531 300641 36.9 40372000 61
2010 3238421 359349 37.6 40587000 55
2011 2975836 466288 36.9 41152000 64
2012 2896985 477528 36.6 41608000 77
2013 2950250 434353 36.9 41841000 79
Vacancy duration q(θt) θt =
vt
ut
ln θt ln q(θt)
(in quarters) =1/vacancy duration
2001 .5 2 .1126619 -2.183364 .6931472
2002 .6086956 1.642857 .0923248 -2.382442 .4964369
2003 .5543478 1.803922 .0616515 -2.786258 .589963
2004 .4456522 2.243902 .0472122 -3.053102 .8082165
2005 .4673913 2.139535 .0569237 -2.866044 .7605885
2006 .5760869 1.735849 .0862708 -2.450264 .5514967
2007 .7065217 1.415385 .1126147 -2.183783 .3474013
2008 .6956522 1.4375 .1193965 -2.125305 .3629055
2009 .6630435 1.508197 .0880475 -2.429878 .4109147
2010 .5978261 1.672727 .1109643 -2.198547 .5144554
2011 .6956522 1.4375 .1566914 -1.853477 .3629055
2012 .8369565 1.194805 .1648362 -1.802803 .1779832
2013 .8586956 1.164557 .1472258 -1.915788 .1523407
Table 28: Data employed for estimation of matching function: Period 2001-2013. Source: Bun-
desagentur fuer Arbeit, Analytikreport der Statistik, July 2014
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Parameter value Parameter explanation and source
i = L i = H
r 0.01 Annual discount rate equal to 4% (assumption)
γ 0.02 Average tenure of self-employed equal to 12.23 years (GSOEP)
δ 0.02 Average tenure of employees equal to 12.25 years (GSOEP)
λ0 0.5832 Constant from the regression of ln q(θt) on ln θt (BA data)
η 0.4379 Slope from the regression of ln q(θt) on ln θt (BA data)
t 0.35 1-ratio between the net (1619 EUR) and gross salary (2505 EUR)
z 0.445 Net unemployment benefit replacement rate in 2008 (CESIfo DICE)
χ1 0.6973 From equation (24) and wage w
H
1I = 0.5119 (via p1y
H
1I)
χ2 0.4054 From equation (24) and wage w
H
2I = 0.4962 (via p1y
H
2I)
p1 1.8395 From equation (24) and normalisation p1y
L
2I = 1
σ 0.3 From Ngai and Pissarides (2004), (we also use σ = 0.1)
a1 0.3516 From C2 = Y2 and p2Y2/(p1Y1 + p2Y2) = 0.5949
αi1N 0.0021 0.0030 Self-employment rates
sL
1N
gL
1N
= 0.0953 and
sH
1N
gH
1N
= 0.1296 (GSOEP)
αi1I 0.0011 0.0033 Self-employment rates
sL
1I
gL
1I
= 0.0504 and
sH
1I
gH
1I
= 0.1414 (GSOEP)
αi2N 0.0016 0.0051 Self-employment rates
sL
2N
gL
2N
= 0.0730 and
sH
2N
gH
2N
= 0.2039 (GSOEP)
αi2I 0.0007 0.0038 Self-employment rates
sL
2I
gL
2I
= 0.0324 and
sH
2I
gH
2I
= 0.1590 (GSOEP)
hi1I 0.9120 0.3157 Unemployment of immigrants
uL
1I
gL
1I
= 0.1490 and
uH
1I
gH
1I
= 0.1855 (GSOEP)
hi2I 0.5794 0.2518 Unemployment of immigrants
uL
2I
gL
2I
= 0.2077 and
uH
2I
gH
2I
= 0.1271 (GSOEP)
βi1 0.8706 0.6480 Gross wage income/output=0.4894 in Sector 1 (DESTATIS 2008)
βi2 0.8037 0.2873 Gross wage income/output=0.3913 in Sector 2 (DESTATIS 2008)
rKi1 0.4678 0.5758 Free-entry conditions (10) for V
L
1 and V
H
1
rKi2 0.6361 0.8196 Free-entry conditions (10) for V
L
2 and V
H
2
ψi1N 0.9908 1.0371 From (25), w
L
1N = 0.4547 and w
H
1N = 0.5784 (via p1y
L
1N and p1y
H
1N )
ψi2N 1.0704 0.9882 From (25), w
L
2N = 0.4239 and w
H
2N = 0.5684 (via p2y
L
2N and p2y
H
2N )
φi1I 1.1046 0.9486 From (26), π
L
1I = 0.5727 and π
H
1I = 0.5012 (via p1ν
L
1I and p1ν
H
1I)
φi1N 0.9946 0.9617 From (26), π
L
1N = 0.4693 and π
H
1N = 0.5160 (via p1ν
L
1N and p1ν
H
1N )
φi2I 0.8076 0.9231 From (26), π
L
2I = 0.1751 and π
H
2I = 0.5234 (via p2ν
L
2I and p2ν
H
2I)
φi2N 1.0269 0.9501 From (26), π
L
2N = 0.3943 and π
H
2N = 0.5625 (via p2ν
L
2N and p2ν
H
2N )
Table 29: Overview of all parameter values
Observation Manufacturing Services
GDP per person, annual value in e 53287 59360
Gross wage bill, annual value in e 26081 23231
Wage to GDP ratio 0.4894 0.3913
Table 30: Wage to GDP ratio for Germany in 2008. Source: DESTATIS, Volkswirtschaftliche
Gesamtrechnungen, Fachserie 18, 1.2
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